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ABSTRACT 
The MV-22 Osprey is a critical component of national defense as it provides the 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) with long-range, assault support capabilities to 
transport combat troops and equipment from ships and land bases to the battlefield. The 
MV-22 fleet has yet to maintain its readiness expectations; given the number of variables 
that contribute to squadron readiness, it is difficult to determine what resources to 
reallocate to guarantee consistent performance. This study examined the multiple 
variables that contribute to squadron performance and determined which are accurate 
predictors of readiness. Descriptive statistics and linear regression were used utilizing 
panel data from every Marine active-duty, deploying MV-22 squadron from fiscal years 
2013 to 2020 to examine the relationship between multiple maintenance and operations 
factors and readiness. The graphical analysis highlighted the correlation between multiple 
explanatory variables and squadron MC% as well as consistent timeframes where most 
squadrons experience a decrease in readiness with different factors affecting their 
recovery. The results of the multivariate regression models showed the relationship 
between numerous Integrated Product Support (IPS) elements and squadron MC% 
whereas a sensitivity analysis conducted using Monte Carlo simulation showed that 
significant improvements in aircraft design and manpower allocation will increase the 
probability of achieving the CNO’s MV-22 readiness goal.
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Marine Corps Aviation is a critical component of national defense as tactical 
aircraft provide the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) with offensive air support, 
assault support, anti-air warfare, air reconnaissance, and electronic warfare capabilities 
(Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], 2001a). The Marine Corps is required to maintain 
“no less than three air wings” to satisfy its Title 10 requirements, which includes providing 
combined arms “in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and providing security 
detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases” (National 
Security Act of 1947, 1947).  
The MV-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps’ medium-lift assault support aircraft 
dedicated to transporting troops and equipment throughout the battlespace and is designed 
to operate from amphibious naval vessels, day, or night, in all weather conditions. To 
support a “fight tonight” force, outlined in the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 
MV-22 squadrons must be postured to rapidly deploy across the range of military 
operations (ROMO) to support expeditionary operations (HQMC, 2019a). An MV-22 
squadron’s ability to respond to crises is determined by its readiness level, which is a 
quantifiable metric used to assess the unit’s ability to conduct operations. Maintaining a 
force that is always ready to deploy requires a continuum of resources, such as well-
maintained aircraft, replacement parts, qualified and well-trained maintenance personnel, 
tooling, and special support equipment. Marginal changes in any of these resources will 
have a dramatic effect on the squadron’s ability to maintain readiness levels to support 
expeditionary operations. 
 PROBLEM  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) allocates a considerable amount of the 
annual defense budget to aviation platform sustainment. Of the $718 billion requested by 
the DOD in the Fiscal Year 2020 Defense Budget, $57.7 billion was allotted to improve 
aviation-related systems across the services, a $2.5 billion increase from the 2019 budget 
2 
request (U.S. Department of Defense [DOD] 2018, 2019). However, despite these 
significant outlays, the U.S. military continually struggles to maintain aviation readiness 
goals set by their respective departments. Most recently, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that across the Departments of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force, “twenty-four aircraft (types)…did not meet their annual mission capable goals 
for any year from fiscal year (FY) 2011 through FY 2019 and only three met their annual 
mission capable goals in a majority of those years” (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 2020 p. 9).  
Notably, the Marine Corps’ MV-22 was one of the platforms identified in the report 
that did not meet its readiness goals. The GAO reports that within the MV-22 program, 
“Maintenance costs increased each year and accounted for 50 percent of the total operations 
and support costs from FY 2011 through FY 2018, averaging about $568 million per year” 
(GAO, 2020). The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) determines readiness thresholds for 
all naval aircraft models; the threshold for the MV-22 is 77% mission capable (MC). 
However, the data sourced from the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) used in this 
study shows that from FY 2013 to FY 2020, the MV-22 average monthly mission capable 
percent (MC%) in deployable squadrons was slightly above 50%. The average monthly 
MC% has also been slowly declining over the past eight years as shown in Figure 1. Table 
1 shows the MC% for the MV-22 fleet as well as the average MC% for sample MV-22 
squadrons operating from each Marine Air Wing (MAW). The MV-22 fleet MC% steadily 




 MV-22 Monthly MC% FY 2013-FY 2020 
Table 1. Average Yearly MC% by MAW 
Average Yearly MC Percent 
FY 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
2013 68.2 62.7 52.6 59.0 
2014 50.7 65.8 48.4 56.5 
2015 55.6 58.4 50.0 54.1 
2016 61.7 478 49.2 50.4 
2017 53.9 45.7 43.6 46.3 
2018 41.5 51.7 41.8 45.5 
2019 40.3 51.3 50.1 48.2 
2020 41.2 44.1 54.2 47.7 
 
As mentioned in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3710.7, the Marine Corps’ Aviation 
Current Readiness Program, several explanatory factors influence the maintenance 
performance and material readiness of an MV-22 squadron, such as the number of flight 
hours the squadron executes, the local supply department’s effectiveness, the age of the 
airframes, the number of qualified personnel, the experience of the maintenance personnel, 
and the number of hours the maintenance personnel worked during the month (HQMC, 
2018). Some of the factors mentioned are more difficult for Marine leadership to control 









2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
FY
 1st MAW Annual MC %  2d MAW Annual MC % 
 3d MAW Annual MC %  MV - 22 Annual Fleet MC % 
MV-22 Annual MC%
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dictated by the squadron’s training exercise and employment plan (TEEP), the airframe 
will continue to age as the aircraft is utilized, and the number of aircraft available for 
assignment is limited and must be disbursed among the squadrons based on their 
operational requirements while continuing to maintain a depot-level maintenance aircraft 
induction schedule. There are, however, potential variables within the Marine Corps’ 
control that could be better managed and have the potential to incrementally increase MC% 
including the number of maintenance personnel assigned to the squadron and their 
experience levels, the average number of work hours per Marine per month, or daily 
maintenance workload management.  
Moreover, Marine Corps aviation squadrons’ deployment periods follow a cyclical 
pattern, deploying overseas every 12–18 months. Squadrons undergo a dramatic change 
during the post-deployment period characterized by a change in executive leadership, new 
maintenance Marines and aircrew, and new personnel to train. Squadrons continually 
conduct local training exercises until they are technically and tactically qualified to 
participate in another overseas deployment. The NAVAIR data used for this research 
shows that MC% is consistently lower for units returning from deployment as operational 
expectations are minimal while the unit resets and refits personnel and equipment. This is 
significant because the data also shows that it takes most squadrons months to recover from 
this sudden drop in MC%. If the goal of a squadron is to maintain 77% MC, the Marine 
Corps needs to allocate these resources effectively throughout the squadron’s deployment 
cycle, which is likely contributing to the Marine Corps’ inability to reach the threshold set 
by the CNO. 
 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to examine what explanatory factors are statistically 
significant in predicting an MV-22 squadron’s average monthly MC%. This study also 
examines each of the factors and how they change relative to significant events across MV-
22 squadrons’ deployment cycle to better understand how readiness changes with time.  
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1. Primary Research Questions 
• What explanatory factors are statistically significant in predicting an MV-
22 squadron’s readiness, as measured by the total monthly MC%?  
The results of the multivariate linear regression (MLR) model show that the 
squadron’s deployment status, mean time between failure (MTBF), the percentage of 
aircraft that are non-mission capable because they are awaiting materials from the supply 
department (NMCS), the average number of aircraft per squadron, the age of the airframes 
in hours, the number of collateral duty quality assurance representatives (CDQARs) and 
quality assurance representatives (QARs), and the total flight hours are statistically 
significant in predicting MV-22 squadron readiness. 
• How do these factors change throughout the squadron’s deployment 
cycle? 
On average, squadrons that are deployed have around 6–7% higher readiness than 
non-deployed squadrons. Furthermore, the mean values of each of the explanatory 
variables differ when squadrons are deployed suggesting multicollinearity between the 
squadron’s deployment status and each of the explanatory factors. This is likely due to the 
significant differences in resource allocation between deployed and non-deployed 
squadrons.  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• How much variability is left unexplained after modeling the statistically 
significant explanatory factors? 
The regression models suffer from multiple violations of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression assumptions that limit their predictive power. The coefficient of 
determination for the final regression model is approximately 41.9% which means roughly 
58% of the variability in MC% is not explained by the regression model. 
• What explanatory factors can be altered to increase the probability that 
MV-22 squadrons will achieve 77% average monthly MC%. 
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The results of the Monte Carlo simulation show that increasing both the number of 
CDQARs and QARs, increasing the MTBF, and reducing the NMCS percentage will 
increase the likelihood of achieving a mean MC% of 77%. Improving both the MTBF and 
NMCS percentage has a greater effect on improving MC% than increasing the number of 
Quality Assurance qualified personnel, however marginally improving each has the 
greatest impact. 
 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
For this research, a dataset built from aircraft readiness and maintenance 
qualification panel data is used to analyze the relationship between potential explanatory 
factors and MC%. The graphical analysis explores the summary statistics of the dependent 
and explanatory variables and time series linear regression is then applied to analyze how 
maintenance predictors affect MC%. To analyze the changes that occur during the 
squadron’s deployment cycle, binary variables represent the squadrons’ overseas 
deployment location, mission, and duration. Additionally, descriptive statistics analyze the 
variability and central tendency of the variables and Monte Carlo simulation explores a 
sensitivity analysis on the explanatory factors and determines which, if any, can be 
modified to increase average monthly MC%. 
The intent of this study is to examine the characteristics that best represent the 
Marine MV-22 organizational level (O-level) population. However, to create a sample with 
similar characteristics, only deployable, active duty, MV-22 squadrons are included. Data 
from aircrew training, test and evaluation, presidential support, and Marine Corps Reserve 
squadrons are removed from the sample. This is due to the variance in manpower staffing, 
operational tempo, average number of aircraft, and increased reliance on civilian contractor 
support which will likely skew the results. The findings of this study may be relevant to 
these omitted units; however, more research must be conducted to better determine 
correlation and statistical significance.  
Additionally, any inference on the causal effects that maintenance factors have on 
a squadron’s mission capable rating is limited to readiness, personnel, and maintenance 
variables available through current data collection means. It is conceivable that other 
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variables contribute to squadron readiness that is not being accurately captured. 
Furthermore, subjective measurements such as a unit’s command climate or maintenance 
competence and experience are not accurately captured as there is currently not an efficient 
measurement for these traits. An analysis of the effects of these traits and recommendations 
for expanded data collection is captured in the summary, conclusion, and recommendations 
section.   
 ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II introduces the MV-22, its 
role within the MAGTF, Marine Aviation and aviation maintenance, aircraft readiness, and 
readiness reporting. Chapter III examines previous research analogous to this thesis topic 
through a literary review. Chapter IV introduces the data sources and the cleaning and 
coding process for use in research. Chapter V describes the variables and presents the 
summary statistics and graphical analysis of the data. Chapter VI examines the MLR 
models, Monte Carlo simulation, and results. Chapter VII concludes the research by 
summarizing the findings and makes recommendations for policy changes and future 
studies. 
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II. MARINE TILTROTOR AVIATION 
 MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE 
The Marine Corps is organized into modular elements that make up the MAGTF. 
The MAGTF provides the combatant commander with a crisis response force capable of 
conducting specific military operations for a limited duration. The force can later be 
expanded if the need for additional forces or capabilities is required. According to HQMC 
2001a, the five types of MAGTFs include, 
• Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
• Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (MEF Fwd) 
• Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 
• Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
• Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 
 
 Types of MAGTF Organizations. Source: HQMC (2001a). 
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According to HQMC 2001a, the MAGTF is divided into 4 elements: 
• Command Element (CE) 
• Ground Combat Element (GCE) 
• Air Combat Element (ACE) 
• Logistics Combat Element (LCE) 
The CE is the command-and-control element that includes the MAGTF commander 
and their staff. The GCE is organized around an infantry unit and is reinforced with armor, 
artillery, combat engineers, and other ground combat units as required. The ACE is 
composed of assault support and attack helicopters, fixed-wing strike, and transport 
aircraft, unmanned aerial reconnaissance aircraft, and their supporting agencies. The LCE 
functions as the logistics support agency and provides transportation, maintenance, 
engineering, food service, and medical services (HQMC, 2001a). 
 
 MAGTF Elements. Adapted from Source: HQMC (2001a). 
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 MARINE AVIATION 
1. Mission 
The ACE provides the MAGTF commander with aviation capabilities required to 
conduct joint operations across the ROMO and achieve the U.S.’s strategic goals. The ACE 
provides mobility and fires, increasing the speed and range of the MAGTF and maximizing 
power projection. According to MCDP 1-0, “the ACE task-organizes to conduct air 
operations, project combat power, and contribute to battlespace dominance in support of 
the MAGTF’s mission by performing some or all of the following six functions of Marine 
aviation” (HQMC, 2001a, pp. 2–8). The six functions of Marine Aviation include, 
• Antiair warfare 
• Assault support 
• Electronic warfare 
• Offensive air support 
• Air reconnaissance 
• Control of aircraft and missiles 
2. Organization 
The ACE does not specifically represent any specific element or unit but instead 
represents a unit that is specifically organized and capable of employing, as the mission 
dictates, any of the six functions of Marine aviation. The ACE can be tailored based on the 
required capabilities but are typically organized administratively at the highest level into 
Marine Aircraft Wings (MAWs). There are three active duty and one reserve aircraft wing 
in the Marine Corps. Each MAW is composed of Marine Aviation Groups (MAGs), Marine 
Air Control Groups, and Marine Wing Support Groups. Each MAG contains multiple 
squadrons of either fixed-wing or rotary-wing assets along with a Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron (MALS) to conduct supply and intermediate maintenance functions, 
while Marine Air Control Groups and Marine Wing Support Groups support aircraft 
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operations through engineering, communications, air-traffic-control, airfield maintenance, 
and other ground support operations. 
 
 Notional Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). 
Source: HQMC (2018). 
 MV-22 OSPREY 
1. Description and Mission 
The Bell/Boeing MV-22 Osprey is a medium-lift assault support aircraft. Its 
mission is to “support the MAGTF commander by providing day/night all-weather assault 
support by transporting combat troops and equipment during expeditionary, joint, or 
combined operations.” (HQMC, 2019b, under “Value to The MAGTF”) The aircraft 
maintains a crew of two pilots and one enlisted aircrewman and can carry up to 24 troops 
(Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2020). Its cabin characteristics are analogous 
to that of the CH-46E Sea Knight; however, it possesses two rotationally controlled nacelle 
turbine housings which allow the aircraft’s proprotors to transition from vertical lift to 
forward propelled flight. This rotating or “tilting” action of the nacelles during the 
transition from vertical to forward flight is what characterizes this aircraft as a tiltrotor. The 
aircraft’s turboprop feature allows for the aircraft to achieve a maximum speed of 280 knots 
with a range of around 430 nautical miles, while also carrying three times the payload of a 
CH-46 (Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2020). 
2. Operational History 
As documented in his book, Dream Machine: The Untold History of the Notorious 
V-22 Osprey, Richard Whittle (2010) describes how the idea of tiltrotor technology has 
bewildered generations of aircraft engineers since the 1920s due to the complexity of 
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designing a propulsion system that can transition from vertical to forward flight. It 
remained a challenge until the early 1980s when NAVAIR began to seriously consider the 
concept of a tiltrotor aircraft. After completing a lengthy acquisitions period with test 
flights that resulted in the deaths of dozens of service members, the MV-22 Osprey would 
reach its initial operating capability (IOC) milestone in 2007. That same year, VMM-263 
would make the Osprey’s first overseas deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(Whittle, 2010). Since then, MV-22 squadrons have deployed in support of a multitude of 
military operations and exercises. During the sample period used in this thesis, MV-22s 
squadrons routinely participated in rotational MAGTFs in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, MEU operations originating from North Carolina, California, and 
Okinawa, Japan, crisis response in Spain and Kuwait, and the Maritime Rotational Force 
in Darwin Australia (MRF-D). 
 
 MV-22 Osprey. Source: Naval Air Systems Command 
(2020). 
3. Squadron Composition 
As presented in Figure 6, an MV-22 squadron is divided up into four departments: 
The Headquarters Department, Operations Department, Maintenance Department, and 
Department of Safety and Standardization. The Headquarters Department is usually led by 
the squadron’s Executive Officer and is responsible for the squadron’s clerical tasks such 
as unit and personnel administration, intelligence gathering and analysis, logistics and 
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embarkation, and communications and information systems. The Operations Department 
is led by the Operations Officer and is responsible for planning and recording squadron 
flight training, annual training, and professional military education. The Maintenance 
Department is led by the Aircraft Maintenance Officer and is responsible for maintaining 
the squadron’s assigned aircraft. The Department of Safety and Standardization (DOSS) is 
led by the DOSS Officer and is responsible for safety-related training, updating, and 
maintaining the squadron’s flight publication library, and keeping the aircrew abreast of 
any current aircraft configuration and performance standard changes. The DOSS Officer is 
also the primary point of contact for any aircraft mishap investigations.  
 
 MV-22 Notional Squadron Composition. Adapted from 
CNAF (2017).  
Marine Corps deployable active duty MV-22 squadrons are located at five distinct 
bases: MCB Camp Pendleton, California; MCAS Miramar, California; MCAS New River, 































shown in Table 2. MV-22 squadrons located in Hawaii and Japan fall under the command 
of 1st MAW, MV-22 squadrons located in North Carolina fall under the command of 2d 
MAW, and MV-22 squadrons located in California fall under the command of 3d MAW. 
Each duty location has its own MAG to support MV-22 aircraft at the respective location 
as shown in Table 2. Each of the squadrons was located at their respective duty locations 
throughout the sample timeframe except for VMM-268 and VMM-362. VMM-268 and 
VMM-362 transitioned from the CH-46 in MCAS Miramar and were then relocated to 
MCB Hawaii in 2016 and 2018, respectively. 
Table 2. List of Sample MV-22 Squadrons 
First Marine Aircraft Wing Second Marine 
Aircraft Wing 























VMM-268 VMM-262 VMM-162 VMM-161 VMM-164 
VMM-362 VMM-265 VMM-261 VMM-163 VMM-364 
  VMM-263 VMM-165  
  VMM-264 VMM-166  
  VMM-266 VMM-2681  
  VMM-365 VMM-362  
   VMM-3632  
1VMM-268 operated the MV-22 at MCAS Miramar from April 2014 to July 2016. 
2VMM-363 operated the MV-22 at MCAS Miramar from May 2012 to June 2018.  
 
16 
 AIRCRAFT READINESS 
1. Aircraft Availability  
The 2019 Aviation Plan (AVPLAN) states the goal of Marine aviation is to “attain 
and maintain combat readiness to support expeditionary maneuver warfare” (HQMC, 
2019b, under “Ready to Fight”). The ACE does this through maintaining aircraft and 
aircrews that can execute all the squadron’s mission essential tasks (METs). An MV-22 
squadron is staffed to support twelve aircraft. However, the number of aircraft assigned to 
a squadron can fluctuate depending on several factors, such as the squadron’s priority in 
the MAG’s training plan or the depot-level maintenance induction schedule. To generate a 
sortie, the squadron’s Maintenance Control division will select aircraft to assign to the 
flight crew, have the aircraft prepared, and certify the aircraft “safe for flight” (SFF). The 
SFF certification ensures the aircraft complies with all current technical directives, all 
outstanding inspections have been completed, no outstanding maintenance actions are 
pending that would render the aircraft “not flight worthy,” and that the aircraft is configured 
for the mission.  
The guidelines for safety of flight determinations are outlined in 
COMNAVFORINST 4790.2 Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP). For an 
aircraft to be considered flight-worthy, it must be in an MC status. If an aircraft is not 
flightworthy, it will be in a non-mission capable (NMC) status. If an aircraft is not 
flightworthy because it is awaiting a maintenance action, it will be in a non-mission 
capable/maintenance (NMCM) status. If an aircraft is non-mission capable because it is 
waiting for a component or material that will return the aircraft to a flyable status, the 
aircraft will be non-mission capable/supply (NMCS). If an aircraft is undergoing depot-
level maintenance, it will be considered non-mission capable/depot (NMCD). If an aircraft 
is still flightworthy but has a system degraded that will not allow the aircraft to utilize its 
full complement of weapons or navigational aids, the aircraft will be considered partial 
mission capable (PMC). A listing of a PMC aircraft’s restrictions is in the MV-22 Mission 
Essential Subsystem Matrices. Like NMC statuses, a PMC aircraft that is waiting for a 
replacement part from the supply department will be NMCS while an aircraft that is PMC 
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waiting for a maintenance action to be performed will be PMCS. An aircraft that can 
perform all assigned missions is considered full mission capable (FMC) (CNAF, 2017). 
Additionally, the NAMP explains how flight hours are captured. Each aircraft 
accumulates hours based on its operational status. The aircraft will accumulate Equipment 
in Service Hours (EISHrs) for every hour it is assigned to a squadron and not undergoing 
depot-level repair. The squadron’s total EIS hours equals the total number of hours that 
aircraft was MC, NMCS, or NMCM. For every hour an aircraft is NMCD, it accumulates 
Equipment Out of Service (EOS) hours. The sum of NMCM hours (NMCMHrs) and 
NMCS hours (NMCSHrs) equals the total non-mission capable hours (NMCHrs) for that 
month. The MC hours (MCHrs) represent the total monthly number of hours that all 
assigned aircraft were MC during the month and is calculated by subtracting the NMC 
hours from the EIS hours and dividing by the EISHrs. MC% represents the average 
monthly percentage of aircraft that are in an MC status out of those that are assigned and 
is calculated by multiplying the MCHrs by 100. Since aircraft undergoing depot-level 
repairs do not accumulate EIS hours, NMCD hours are removed from consideration when 
determining monthly MCHrs or MC% (CNAF 2017). 
 
 NMCHrs = NMCSHrs + NMCMHrs  (1) 




2. Readiness Reporting 
Squadron readiness is reported in three different ways, the first of which is the 
Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS). 
According to HQMC 2001b, NALCOMIS is the primary information and configuration 
management system that maintenance and logistics personnel use to track aircraft material 
management. NALCOMIS has two configurations, the Optimized Organizational 
Maintenance Activity (OOMA) and the Optimized Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
(OIMA). OOMA is used at the organizational level to monitor aircraft, engines, support 
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equipment, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, and operating hours, aircrew and 
maintenance personnel, aircraft and equipment assignment, and deployment. OOMA will 
also transfer material requisitions to the OIMA which perform many of the same functions 
as OOMA to manage intermediate level maintenance. OIMA also includes stocking and 
warehousing functions that integrate with the Relational Supply (R-Supply) inventory 
management information system to order, track, and receive material requisitions and assist 
in financial management (HQMC, 2001b). 
Aircraft readiness is also reported daily utilizing the Aviation Maintenance Supply 
Readiness Reporting System (AMSRR). AMSRR is a web-based reporting system that 
details the aircraft status of each squadron aircraft along with any outstanding, high-priority 
supply requisitions. AMSRR provides a summary for both military and civilian 
maintenance and logistic leadership to address areas of immediate concern. Unlike OOMA 
and OIMA that continually record and report data, AMSRR reports are only submitted by 
maintenance and supply leadership once per workday.  
Lastly, the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) is 
used to report the squadron’s monthly operational capability, which is their ability to satisfy 
the unit’s core METs. According to MCO 3000.13B, “DRRS-MC data directly reports on 
the unit readiness and capability, and capacity to meet requirements pillars while 
supporting analysis on the remaining pillars” (HQMC, 2020, p 1–1). The five pillars of 
institutional readiness are  
• Unit Readiness 
• Capability and Capacity to Meet Requirements 
• High-Quality People 
• Infrastructure Sustainment 
• Equipment Modernization 
The flow of aircraft status and material reporting is shown in Figure 7. OOMA 
records all aircraft maintenance and supply transactions and reports in real-time. The data 
from OOMA is input by the squadron’s maintenance leadership every workday into the 
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AMSRR web portal. The aircraft readiness data from AMSRR is reported to DRRS-MC 
monthly.  
 
 The Flow of Information from Maintenance System to 
Readiness Reporting System Source: DOD Inspector General 
(2018). 
 MARINE AVIATION MAINTENANCE 
1. Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
Marine Aviation Maintenance is governed by the NAMP. The NAMP standardizes 
the roles and responsibilities of O-level, intermediate level (I-level), and depot level (D-
level) activities. The objective of the NAMP is “to achieve the aviation material readiness 
and safety standards established by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and CNAF in 
coordination with the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).” (CNAF, 2017, p.1.2.2) 
The NAMP is sponsored by the CNO, managed by CNAF, and updated periodically to 
ensure safe and relevant maintenance operations. All changes are reviewed by a NAMP 
working committee (CNAF, 2017).  
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2. Organization 
An MV-22 squadron’s maintenance department is led by the Aviation Maintenance 
Officer, who is typically an aviator at the rank of Major. He is assisted by an Assistant 
Aircraft Maintenance Officer whose military occupational specialty (MOS) is aircraft 
maintenance officer. The NAMP task organizes the maintenance department into divisions 
and work centers, shown in Figure 8. Four of which perform mostly administrative 
functions and are commonly referred to as “non-production” divisions. The Maintenance 
Control Division is responsible for delegating scheduled and unscheduled maintenance 
tasks, assigning aircraft, preparing the daily flight schedule, and certifying aircraft “safe 
for flight.” The Quality Assurance Division is responsible for overseeing and auditing the 
NAMP’s maintenance programs and adherence to all technical maintenance publications. 
The Maintenance Administration Division is responsible for aircraft documentation to 
include all maintenance and flight records and the incorporation of technical directives. 
The Tool Control Division is responsible for issuing and maintaining the squadron’s tools, 
individual material readiness listing assets, and support equipment.  
Four divisions perform scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on MV-22 aircraft 
and equipment, known as “production,” divisions. The Airframes Division is responsible 
for metal and composite work on the aircraft’s airframe and support structures, including 
the treatment and removal of corrosion. They are also responsible for maintaining the 
aircraft’s hydraulic systems, wheels, and tires. The Avionics Division is responsible for 
troubleshooting and maintaining electrical, communications, navigation, weapons, and 
countermeasures systems. The Flightline Division is responsible for maintaining and 
repairing engines, proprotor, and drive system components. The Flightline Division is also 
responsible for the execution of daily and post-flight maintenance inspections. The 
Ordnance Division is responsible for loading and maintaining the aircraft’s crew-served 





 O-Level Maintenance Department Line and Staff 
Relationship (Marine Corps). Source: CNAF (2017).  
3. Maintenance Qualifications 
To ensure safe and efficient maintenance and flight operations, three maintenance 
qualifications are required to certify the work performed by maintenance personnel is 
conducted following technical publications and local regulations. The QAR is the highest 
technical qualification within the squadron and they are predominately located within the 
Quality Assurance Division. QARs are extremely skilled on their respective platforms and 
have completely satisfied their Aviation Maintenance Training Readiness Program 
(AMTRP) syllabus, which records individual maintenance training and skills. QARs are 
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responsible for NAMP program adherence as well as the overall safety and efficiency of 
the maintenance department. They are also responsible for monitoring and training 
maintenance personnel as well as recommending personnel for maintenance qualifications. 
The two additional qualifications that are held within the production divisions are the 
Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI) and CDQAR qualifications. CDIs inspect all the scheduled 
and unscheduled maintenance actions that are performed by personnel within their 
division. CDQARs are more experienced maintenance personnel and perform the duties of 
a QAR within the division. Like CDIs they will inspect all maintenance actions performed 
within their respective work center but can inspect work performed by other work centers 
if they have a sufficient level of training in that respective area.  
CDI is the most junior QA qualification and most Marines become eligible for the 
CDI qualification at the paygrade of E-4 or three years-time in service. CDQAR is the next 
senior QA qualification and most Marines become eligible for the CDQAR qualification 
at the paygrade of E-5 or about four to five years-time in service. QAR is the most senior 
QA qualification and most Marines become eligible for the QA qualification at the 
paygrade of E-6 or around six to seven years-time in service. The most current NAMP 
update in 2017 included a new provision that placed a minimum rank requirement to 
achieve these maintenance qualifications where there was not one before. It specifies the 
following paygrade required for QA qualification eligibility.  
• CDI – Paygrade of E-4. 
• CDQAR – Paygrade of E-5 
• QAR – Paygrade of E-6. 
The 2017 NAMP Change Proposal Memorandum states the justification for the 
change as to simply eliminate squadrons/IMAs from assigning junior personnel to QA 
functions. The NAMP does however provide simple procedures for relief when the 
paygrade requirement cannot be met due to manpower shortages (Ainsworth, 2017). 
 SUMMARY 
Marine Aviation enhances the speed, range, and lethality of the MAGTF, and the 
MV-22 provides the combatant commander a more mobile and responsive force. The MV-
23 
22 is a significant improvement over its predecessor and its tiltrotor technology is a 
significant engineering achievement. Maximizing the operational availability of any 
military airframe requires a multitude of resources and a well-trained cadre of maintenance 
personnel and aircrew. However, given the underwhelming historical readiness figures for 
the MV-22 fleet, a closer examination into the allocation of resources may indicate areas 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this section is to analyze publications that are analogous to the 
problem presented in this research project. This helps identify gaps in the current library 
of research and assist in determining how this thesis can best address the Marine Corps’ 
MV-22 readiness shortfalls through a close examination of work written by other 
professionals and academics who have used relevant tools to address similar operational 
readiness, material and manpower resourcing, and management issues. 
 AVIATION READINESS ISSUES 
Many articles have been written that highlight the U.S. military’s struggle to 
maintain its aircraft fleet, the most recent and comprehensive of which was a study 
conducted by the GAO titled Weapon System Sustainment: Aircraft Mission Capable Rates 
Generally Did Not Meet Goals and Cost of Sustaining Selected Weapons Systems Varied 
Widely. Released in November 2020, the study examined the material condition and 
operations and support cost for 46 aircraft platforms across the Departments of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force from FY 2011 to FY 2019, shown in Figure 9. Of the 46 aircraft they 
examined, six were five percentage points below their mission-capable goals, 18 were six 
to 15% below their mission-capable goal, and 19 were over 15 percentage points below 
their goal during the eight years (GAO, 2020, p. 9). 
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 Number of Times Selected Aircraft Met Their Annual 
Mission Capable Goal, Fiscal Years 2011–2019. 
Source: GAO (2020). 
Most notably, the MV-22 platform failed to meet its annual mission-capable goal 
once during this timeframe. Some of the challenges they highlighted shown in Figure 10 
included unexpected replacement of parts and repairs, access to technical data, shortage of 
trained maintenance personnel, and parts shortages and delays. Additionally, according to 
government officials in the GAO report, “unavailability due to depot, maintenance, and 
supply issues, increased from FY 2011 to FY 2019 because of issues with corrosion, 
engineering delays, and supply shortages” (GAO, 2020 p. 190). Furthermore, the GAO’s 
independent analysis found that the most challenging sustainment issues are addressing 
corrosion found during depot level repair, retrofitting older airframes with updated 
equipment to reduce unique aircraft configurations, and increasing spare parts availability. 
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 Selected Challenges Affecting Some of the Selected 
Department of Defense Aircraft. Source: GAO (2020). 
 PARAMETERS THAT INFLUENCE AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY 
Employees from The Boeing Company conducted a study that analyzed the 
numerous factors that contribute to long-range bomber and strike aircraft availability 
(Andresen & Williams, 2011). The authors separated these factors into three categories, 
shown in Figure 11: aircraft design, maintenance infrastructure, and operations. They 
found that the design of the aircraft is extremely important as increasingly complex 
components and avionics systems must be reliable and maintainable. Furthermore, aircraft 
diagnostics and fault isolation infrastructure are key to maintaining these systems and have 
a major influence on aircraft availability. Their primary metric for the reliability of the 
aircraft is MTBF or the average time between unscheduled NMC events while Cannot 
Duplicates (CND) and Re-test Oks (RTOK) measure the number of fault isolations that can 
either not be duplicated by maintenance personnel on the aircraft or by other diagnostic 
test means. The mean time between preventative maintenance (MTBPM) measures the 
amount of time between scheduled maintenance events while Mean Preventative 
Maintenance Time (Mpt) measures the amount of time it takes to perform the preventative 
maintenance tasks. The primary means of measuring maintainability is the Mean Time to 
Repair (MTTR). The maintenance workforce is measured by the number of available 
maintainers while spares availability and time to complete administrative tasks are captured 
by Mean Administrative and Logistics Time (MALDT). The effect of flight operations is 
captured by the probability of having to conduct maintenance away from the home location 
or remote maintenance (Premote). 
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 Availability Influencing Parameters and Metrics. Source: 
Andresen and Williams (2011).  
The study found that one-third of the downtime of the Air Force’s long-range 
bomber fleet was down for depot inspection and refurbishment, shown in Figure 12. Of the 
remaining NMC time, 76% was spent NMCM, 15% was spent NMCS and 9% was both 
NMCS and NMCM. Of the NMCM time, 80% was NMCM/unscheduled (NMCMU). The 
trend was similar in long-range strike aircraft where 57% of the downtime was attributed 
to NMCM, 27% was NMCS and 22% was both NMCM and NMCS, shown in Figure 13. 
Unscheduled maintenance also made up 76% of the total NMCM time (Andresen Williams, 
2011) 
 
 Long-Range Bomber Aircraft Unavailability. Source: 
Andresen and Williams (2011)   
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 Long-Range Strike Aircraft Unavailability. Source: 
Andresen and Williams (2011).  
The author’s used their proprietary System Health Operational Analysis Model 
(SHOAM), a stochastic discrete event simulation tool to conduct a sensitivity analysis on 
each of the performance metrics to understand how aircraft availability is influenced by 
marginal changes in each parameter. They found that “a 20% improvement in avionics 
structures, and propulsion inherent reliability results in more than a 3% improvement in 
operational availability” (Andresen and Williams, 2011, p. 7-7). They also found that 
increases in maintainability are sensitive to changes and that increasing manpower, 
availability of spare parts, resources at repair locations, and improving the maintenance 
concept and management decisions all positively influence aircraft availability (Andresen 
and Williams, 2011). These findings are relevant to this study because of the homogeneity 
of the performance metrics. The Boeing Company and U.S. Air Force’s approach to aircraft 
maintenance theory are similar to the Marine Corps’ approach and the maintenance 
infrastructure and processes are analogous; many of the same performance metrics used by 
Boeing in their SHOAM model are applicable and the data is readily available. 
 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANPOWER 
Members of the Air Force Analysis for Lessons Learned and the Department of 
Operational Sciences from the Air Force Institute of Technology published a study that 
examined the effect that qualified aircraft maintenance personnel had on manpower 
utilization and aircraft sortie generation, as measured by the number of weekly flight 
cancelations (MacKenzie, Miller, Hill, & Chambal, 2012). They used an agent-based 
simulation model with historical data from a single fighter aircraft squadron to measure the 
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relationship between the different maintenance work centers and their experience levels. 
They also simulated both a 10% increase and decrease in manning levels to better 
understand how the number of weekly flight cancellations responds to manpower 
fluctuations. They simulated multiple historical maintenance factors shown in Figure 14, 
such as the number of aircraft, number of personnel, break rate, abort rate, fix rates, fix 
rates, and average sortie duration. They also simulated multiple work unit codes (WUCs), 
the crew size, and the Air Force Specialty Code Assignment, (AFSC). WUCs are codes 
given to identify aircraft subsystems and AFSCs are Air Force military occupation codes 
representing the Airman’s primary occupation specialty. AFSCs were limited to Crew 
Chiefs, Avionics, Electro-Environmental, and Jet Propulsion in their research. They also 
added a variable for the maintainer learning curve or the rate at which maintenance 
personnel’s skills improve, based on qualitative input from Air Force senior leaders. This 
would account for the increase in worker efficiency over time (MacKenzie, Miller, Hill, & 
Chambal, 2012). 
 
 Agent-Based Modeling Data Requirements and Definitions 
Source: MacKenzie, Miller, Hill, and Chambal (2012).  
In the author’s research, they found that the utilization rate of many AFSCs is 
affected by the manning levels of the others. This is contrary to their assumption that since 
AFSCs work independently and there is no cross-sharing of job tasks, there is no significant 
relationship between the AFSCs. This indicates that increased levels of specific AFSCs 
may be required as extended maintenance is increased. Furthermore, weekly cancellations 
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were reduced under circumstances where manning was at increased levels shown in Figure 
15. The flat slope of the weekly cancelations indicates that the maintenance department is 
in what they call “survival-mode” or can only maintain a consistent level of performance. 
(MacKenzie, Miller, Hill, & Chambal, 2012, p.97) Conversely, with increased manning 
levels, the number of weekly cancellations slowly decreased providing evidence of an 
increase in worker efficiency. This publication justifies the inclusion of Marine manning 
levels and qualifications by work center for use in this research project. While qualified 
maintenance personnel is required to certify aircraft safe for flight and inspect work orders, 
the extent to which the number of personnel and qualifications from different work centers 




 Comparison of Cancellations per Week. 
Source: MacKenzie et al. (2012).     
 EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR MARINE AVIATION 
In his thesis research project, Chesterton (2005) uses multivariate regression to 
examine the relationship between numerous maintenance explanatory factors and 
maintenance performance as defined by the amount of time it took maintainers to perform 
maintenance actions or man-hours per maintenance action. He attributed maintenance 
performance to time efficiency stating:  
How should maintainer performance be measured? The speed and 
correctness with which maintenance actions are conducted are important 
aspects of performance, although they may be difficult to quantify. External 
factors, such as the availability of repair parts and the operations tempo of 
the squadron, also affect measures that may be used to describe maintenance 
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performance. Therefore, we use man-hours per maintenance action as a 
measure of performance, due to its direct relationship to the actions of the 
maintainers, and to limits the effects of external confounding factors (p. 
XV). 
Chesterton (2005) examined 13 F/A-18 squadrons across the Marine Corps with 
time series data spanning two years and defined numerous measures of efficiency with 
maintenance and flight data from NALCOMIS and The Navy Inventory and Readiness 
Reporting System as well as support from engineering technical services using the from 
Engineering Technical Service Local Request system, shown in Figure 16. He also created 
measurements of maintainer experience level through time in service and time in squadron 
data source through The Marine Corps Total Force System, the Marines Corps’ personnel, 
and payroll operating system.  
 
 Chesterton’s Variables. Source: Chesterton (2005).  
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Chesterton (2005) regressed the aircrafts’ type equipment code (TEC) which 
represents a unique aircraft type within the F/A-18 model platform, average aircraft hours 
in service, duty station location, the median months in the squadron of maintenance 
personnel, and deployment status. He found that TEC, average aircraft hours in service, 
location, median months in the squadron, and deployment status were all significant 
variables that predicted manhours per maintenance action.  
 
 
 Chesterton’s Regression Model. Source Chesterton (2005). 
However, Chesterton (2005) suffered from a relatively low coefficient of 
determination (r-squared value) of approximately 0.48 meaning his model only explained 
roughly 48% of the variability across F/A-18 squadrons. This study looks to improve on 
Chesterton’s work through a larger sample size and more significant independent variables 
to improve the predictive power of the regression model. This study also uses Monte Carlo 
simulation to conduct a sensitivity analysis on the model to improve resource allocation 
and increase MC%. 
 READINESS PREDICTORS 
This research also seeks to expand upon the research conducted by Germershausen 
and Steele in their Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis The Effect of USMC Enlisted 
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Aviation Maintenance Qualification on Aviation Readiness. The basis of their research was 
that: 
The problem is created by this system that a mechanic could theoretically 
possess an aviation maintenance Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 
but have no authority to fix aircraft or increase readiness. Assuming that 
aviation measures its outcomes in terms of successful operations and 
readiness, proper values should be assigned to qualifications. Human capital 
resulting from training is not formally valued as a maintainer ad no 
monetary value has been assigned to qualifications in providing a basis for 
proper reenlistment incentives. In a country that places a high demand on 
its Marine Corps, and in a world that is growing increasingly technical, there 
is cause for concern of improper staffing and retention process (p. 3). 
Germershausen and Steele (2015) used multivariate analysis to determine the effect 
that enlisted maintenance qualifications have on readiness. They created a time series data 
set with maintenance data from 2012 to 2015 sourced from the Decision Knowledge 
Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation (DECKPLATE) and 
Marine Aviation Commander’s Current Readiness Assessment Tool (MCCRAT).  
Table 3. Germershausen and Steele’s Time Series Regression Model 
Adapted from Germershausen and Steele (2015). 
Variables Definitions 




Highest Qual Highest Qualification 
Pvt Private 
PFC Private First Class 
LCpl Lance Corporal 
Cpl Corporal 
Sgt Sergeant 
SSgt Staff Sergeant 
GySgt Gunnery Sergeant 
Active Qualification is Active 
AFQT_SCORE AFQT overall test score 
Married Married 
Number of Dependents Number of dependents  
White Race is White  
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Variables Definitions 
YOS Years of Service 
RBAP RBA Percentage 
HMH Heavy Helicopter Squadron 
HMLA Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 
VMM Tiltrotor Squadron 
activeCDI Active CDI interaction variable 
activeCDQAR Active CDQAR interaction variable 
activeQAR Active QAR interaction variable 
NMCS Non-mission capable supply percentage 
NCO Non-commissioned officer 
SNCO Staff non-commissioned officer 
 
Steele and Germershausen’s time series regression models were used to determine 
the impact that multiple variables shown in Table 3, had on readiness percentage. They 
used a squadron’s MC% as their dependent variable. They used the number of 
qualifications, the average number of aircraft, NMCS hours, and deployed status to 
determine likely predictors of increasing a squadron’s mission capable percentage; their 
regression model is shown in Figure 18. They found that while the variables affected 
helicopter squadrons differently depending on the type of aircraft, the number of 
qualifications had a positive effect on mission-capable ratings, meaning a squadron with 
more qualified personnel typically had higher mission capable percentages than those with 
less qualified individuals. Their final models also had a higher R-squared value than the 
Chesterton model, roughly ranging from 76.1% to 87.7% across all three Marine rotary-
wing type squadrons (Steele & Germershausen 2015). 
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 Germershausen and Steele’s Time Series Regression 
Model. Source: Germershausen and Steele (2015). 
This study improves on Steele and Germershausen’s findings by adding more 
accurate explanatory variables to the regression model as there are likely more predictors 
of readiness than just NMCS percentage, number of planes, qualifications, and deployment 
status. The sample size is also increased in this study and examines qualification 
contributions by each production work center. This study also focuses specifically on the 
MV-22 platform to go beyond the positive or negative contributions of qualified personnel, 
but also seek to determine what if any variables when modified, can increase the probability 
of meeting the platform’s annual readiness goal. This study also introduces time as a 
significant factor by examining how each explanatory variable is affected across a 
squadron’s deployment cycle. 
 SUMMARY 
GAO (2020) emphasizes the severity of the Marine Corps’ operational availability 
problem and highlights the need for further analysis. The subsequent scholarly sources 
represent previous research that analyzes Marine Aviation readiness as well as tools and 
methods used in measuring operational availability. The amount of analytical research on 
Marine O-level readiness factors is sparse and there is a significant gap in measuring the 
impact that specific aviation resources have on Marine O-level squadron readiness. This 
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thesis looks to close this research gap by measuring the impact of numerous MV-22 
product support and operational variables and creating a mathematical model that is 
sufficient in predicting how operational availability will be affected through changes in 
resource allocation. 
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IV. DATA SOURCES, CLEANING, AND CODING 
1. Introduction 
Data collection for this research begins with the familiarization of sources that 
contain historical O-level squadron data. The three primary data warehouses that provide 
the panel data for this study are MCCRAT, DECKPLATE, and the Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW). Additionally, the units’ Command Chronologies, a historical record 
of the unit’s significant activities, verify deployment assignment. All data from MCCRAT, 
TFDW, and the Command Chronologies were provided via email request. All 
DECKPLATE data was retrieved by the author from the DECKPLATE online portal. The 
timeframe for the panel data is limited to no earlier than 2012 which is when MCCRAT 
began capturing qualifications, certifications, and licenses (QCLs).  
In aggregating the data, two Microsoft Excel spreadsheets were compiled, one with 
MCCRAT qualifications and one with DECKPLATE readiness data. Additional 
DECKPLATE data was later extracted and added to the readiness spreadsheet while the 
TFDW manpower data was added to the MCCRAT spreadsheet. The two spreadsheets 
were then merged using Stata 16, which was also used for the graphical and regression 
analysis. Both MCCRAT and DECKPLATE identify months where squadrons had 
personnel deployed overseas however the data is sorted differently requiring additional 
verification of the overseas location and aircraft allocation using the units’ Command 
Chronologies. 
2. Sample Squadrons  
To make the best comparison between squadrons, data is only from active duty 
MV-22 squadrons that routinely deploy in support of the MAGTF; all others are removed 
because they have specific manpower and personnel requirements that are specific to their 
mission and unlike that of tactical MV-22 squadrons. Additionally, squadrons that have 
been operating continuously from October 2012 to September 2020 have 96 months-worth 
of readiness and qualification data. However, some squadrons have data missing due to 
being commissioned, decommissioned, or transitioning from CH-46 to MV-22. 
40 
Additionally, some squadrons have months with a high number of EIS hours, number of 
Marines, and QA qualified Marines, but do not have recorded maintenance or flight hours 
during the month. This appears most often during major squadron movements or transitions 
such as VMM-363’s movement to Kuwait for the first SPMAGTF Crisis Response Central 
Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) deployment along with their subsequent squadron 
relocation to Hawaii, VMM-268’s relocation to Hawaii, and VMM-165’s transition to 
Kuwait for SPMAGTF-CR-CC. This results in seven months of unreliable data being 
recorded and therefore dropped from inclusion for this study. Table 4 displays the sample 
squadrons along with the number of months of observations while Figure 19 shows the 
monthly sample distribution by MAW. 
Table 4. Sample Squadrons 




VMM-161 96  
VMM-162 96  
VMM-163 96  
VMM-164 63 Transitioned to MV-22B in Aug 2015 
VMM-165 95 1 Month of unreliable data 
VMM-166 96  
VMM-261 96  
VMM-262 85 Transitioned to MV-22B Sep 2013 
VMM-263 96  
VMM-264 92 Decommissioned June 2020 
VMM-265 96  
VMM-266 96  
VMM-268 75 Transitioned to MV-22B in April 2014, 
3 months of unreliable data 
VMM-362 23 Commissioned in October 2018 
VMM-363 96 3 months of unreliable data 
VMM-364 69 Transitioned to MV-22B in Jan 2015 
VMM-365 96  
Total 1,458  
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 MV-22 Sample Distribution by MAW 
3. Panel Data  
a. MCCRAT Qualifications 
MCCRAT is a database that compiles Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) 
performance metrics with guidance from the Deputy Commandant of Aviation. It is used 
as a tool to quickly measure and assess each unit’s maintenance personnel capability based 
on the required maintainer competency (RMC) data (N. James, email to author, December 
21, 2020) shown in Figure 20. The RMC data is populated from the Advance Skills 
Management (ASM) tool that each unit uses to track maintainer qualifications and 
competency. Some of the metrics include the number of personnel who possess specific 
QCLs such as the CDI/CDQAR/QAR qualifications. The number of monthly qualified 











Source: N. James, RMC Tier II and II Worksheet email to author, December 22, 2020 
 RMC Chart of Unit Qualifications. 
The purpose of the MCCRAT dataset is to provide the number of maintainers from 
production work centers who possess a CDI/CDQAR/QAR qualification and analyze how 
the number of these qualifications affects the squadron’s monthly MC%. The MCCRAT 
dataset is organized by squadron and military occupational specialty (MOS), the Marine’s 
military career field. Additionally, the RMC data from MCCRAT contains the QCLs on 
hand, the minimum QCLs required to conduct efficient maintenance operations, and the 
number of QCL deficiencies for every MOS in the squadron for the given timeframe. For 
use in this research, the number of QCLs required and the number of deficiencies are 
removed only leaving the on-hand quantity per month. Furthermore, several of the 
squadron’s MOSs are either clerical or perform maintenance on safety and support 
equipment and do not have an impact on a squadron’s MC%. These MOS’s are removed 
leaving only the Avionics, Airframe, Flightline, and Crew Chief MOSs. 
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Within these four categories, the Avionics work center falls under the Avionics 
Division and Avionic technicians perform testing and diagnostics on electrical, 
communication, and navigation systems. They also remove and replace electrical 
components. The Airframes work center falls under the Airframe Division and Airframe 
mechanics are responsible for maintaining and repairing the airframe and composite 
structures, hydraulics, systems, wheels, brakes, and tires. The Flightline work center falls 
under the Flightline Division and is comprised of two MOSs, Flightline mechanics and 
crew chiefs. Flightline mechanics are full-time tiltrotor mechanics who perform 
troubleshooting and replacement of engine, fuel, proprotor, and drive systems. They also 
perform aircraft pre-flight and turnaround inspections. In contrast, the Crew Chiefs’ 
primary responsibility is as enlisted aircrewmen. They perform airborne support roles such 
as in-flight system troubleshooting and diagnosis and pre-and post-flight inspections if the 
aircraft is forward-deployed away from its home location. However, to gain proficiency in 
these areas, they also function as Flightline mechanics when not conducting flight 
operations. Once approved for CDI/CDQAR/QAR qualification, mechanics in each MOS 
will obtain the qualification for that respective work center shown in Table 5; both tiltrotor 
mechanics and enlisted aircrewmen will be designated a CDI/CDQAR/QAR for the 
Flightline work center.  
Table 5. MV-22 Production Work Center MOSs 













6326 6116/6176 6156 
 
Table 6 identifies each of the unique variable names for each work center and 
qualification. Each qualification is unique, however, due to the similarities in their 
respective duties and the low variance in the number of QARs and CDQARs in the 
squadron, these two variables were combined into a “QA” variable shown in Table 7. 
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Furthermore, the CDI, CDQAR, and QAR qualifications were merged into one variable 
called “Qual,” which represents the number of Marines who possess and advanced 
qualifications during that month regardless of the level of the certification. 
Table 6. MCCRAT Variable Definitions 
MCCRAT Data Field Description 
Month Month data was pulled 
Squadron Aviation Squadron 
Deployed 1 if squadron was deployed, 0 otherwise 
AVI CDI Avionics CDI 
AVI CDQAR Avionics CDQAR 
AVI QAR Avionics QAR 
AF CDI Airframes CDI 
AF CDQAR Airframes CDQAR 
AF QAR Airframes QAR 
FL CDI Flightline CDI 
FL CDAR Flightline CDQAR 
FL QAR Flightline QAR 
CC CDI Crew Chief CDI 
CC CDQAR Crew Chief CDQAR 
CC QAR Crew Chief QAR 
Table 7. Work Center Qualifications 
CDI CDQAR + QAR CDI + CDQAR + QAR 
AVICDI AVIQA AVIQUAL 
AFCDI AFQA AFQUAL 
FLCDI FLQA FLWCQUAL 
CCCDI CCQA CCQUAL 
 
b. DECKPLATE Readiness Data 
DECKPLATE is an online, maintenance and logistics data management tool used 
by NAVAIR, NAE, and aviation maintenance leadership. It is the central repository for all 
material records of aviation maintenance, aircraft, support equipment, engines, and 
aviation depot-level repairable components. DECKPLATE has provided more than 25 
years of web-enabled access with near real-time detailed data about more than 4,100 
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Marine Corps and Navy aircraft, wherever they are deployed (Teradata, 2016). 
DECKPLATE can be accessed by anyone with a user account and data reports can be 
pulled using IBM COGNOS. DECKPLATE has several prebuilt reports based on NAE, 
NAVAIR, or NAMP requirements. A common report, known as the DP-0036 report 
provides numerous routinely requested monthly squadron performance variables such as 
flight hours, the average number of aircraft assigned to the squadron, EIS hours, as well as 
NMCM, NMCS, MC, PMC, PMCS, and FMC percentages and hours. The DP-0036 report 
serves as the basis for readiness data used for this study. User-built reports can also be 
constructed through the Query Studio feature. Query Studio allows the user to combine 
and filter numerous random variables to build a dataset. Multiple Query Studio reports 
were built for this study to augment the data in the DP-0036 report to provide multiple 
potential explanatory variables. Figure 21 shows a sample user-built report constructed in 
Query Studio which contains MV-22 squadrons’ monthly awaiting maintenance and 
awaiting parts hours filtered by the MV-22 TEC code (AYNE) from October 2012 to 
September 2020.  
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 Notional Query Studio User-Built Report Source: 
DECKPLATE (2020). 
The time series dataset obtained from the DP-0036 report contains monthly 
readiness data from selected Marine MV-22 units. For use in this study, the data has to be 
sorted by aircraft TEC because an MV-22 squadron absorbs the entire ACE within its 
administrative control when combined as a MEU. Therefore, readiness reports contain all 
ACE aircraft, which often includes other type/model/series (TMS) aircraft. Sorting 
readiness reports by TEC removes the erroneous data from other TMS aircraft. Otherwise, 
the readiness data for MV-22 units in support of the MEU would be inaccurate due to the 
presence of CH-53, H-1 data, or AV-8B aircraft reporting data. The relevant data for use 
in this study is displayed in Table 8. After this step, multiple user reports were pulled with 
additional variables of interest that are likely predictors of a squadron’s MC%, shown in 
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Table 9. Such variables include the total monthly man-hours, awaiting maintenance hours, 
airframe hours, and the total number of NMC work orders known as maintenance action 
forms (MAFs). 
Table 8. DP-0036 Relevant Data Fields 
Data Field Description 
Owner Org Code Squadron Organization Code 
Squadron Aircraft Squadron Name 
Comp Date Report Month 
Total Flt Hrs Total Monthly Flight Hours 
Avg Aircraft Average Number of Aircraft Assigned 
MC Hrs Monthly Mission Capable Hours 
MC % Monthly Mission Capable Percentage 
NMCS Hrs Monthly partial mission-capable/supply hours 
NMCS % Monthly partial mission-capable/supply percentage 
Table 9. Additional Variables of Interest 





Monthly number of worker 





Total number of flight hours 
on every airframe assigned to a 
squadron at that month 
Awaiting 
Maintenance Hours AWM 
DECKPLATE 
User Report 
Total monthly number of hours 
that aircraft were NMC and not 
in work or AWP 
Number of NMC 
MAFS DOWNMAFS 
DECKPLATE 
User Report Monthly Number NMC events 
 
c. TFDW Manpower Data 
TFDW is a data warehouse that stores monthly snapshots of personnel data 
extracted from two dozen data sources. It is the Marine Corps’ “primary system of record 
and houses more than 30 years of historical manpower data from a variety of USMC and 
DOD systems” (Total Force Data Warehouse [TFDW], 2020 under “What is TFDW”). 
TFDW provides the monthly number of personnel in each of the three production work 
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centers shown in Table 10, to analyze the impact that the total monthly number of Marines 
in each work center affects MC%.  
Table 10. TFDW Variables 
TFDW Data Field Description 
Snapshot Date Month data was pulled 
Squadron Aviation Squadron 
Platoon Number Work Center Number 
MOS Primary MOS Code 
Description Work center description 
Total Total Number of Marines 
 
d. Command Chronology 
The Marine Corps’ Command Chronology Program is a historical documentation 
program that records significant events in a unit’s history. The purpose is to provide 
tangible evidence of unit and individual achievement to “foster military virtue and provide 
a means to extensively evaluate lessons of the past” (HQMC 2009 p. 5.1(c)(2)). The 
Command Chronology is a document submitted by the unit that is both qualitative and 
quantitative; it provides both a written account of plans, operations, and other key events 
as well as a snapshot of maintenance and operational data, such as monthly MC% and total 
monthly flight hours. The units’ Command Chronologies are used to verify unit 
participation in MEU deployments because assignment as the MEU ACE does not generate 
a unique organizational code signifying assignment to the MEU. 
4. Deployments     
The sample MV-22 squadrons in this study have operated away from their home 
locations on many dozens of different military exercises and operations, with each exercise 
requiring a unique combination of personnel and material resources to support depending 
on the mission type, duration, and the number of aircraft required to support. Neither 
MCCRAT nor DECKPLATE provides locations of personnel, QA qualified or otherwise, 
deployed in support of an exercise. Therefore, the data does not support analyzing every 
MV-22 detachment for training during the sample period.  
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Both DECKPLATE and MCCRAT record squadron’s overseas deployments 
differently. The MCCRAT data contains a binary string variable of “DEPLOYED” if the 
squadron was deployed overseas and “NON-DEPLOYED” if the squadron was not. The 
DECKPLATE data identifies the squadron with a unique organizational code (Org Code) 
if the squadron was deployed as the ACE in support of a SPMAGTF; however, the Org 
Code would reflect the status quo if the squadron was deployed in support of the MEU. 
Table 11 shows a sample data entry where VMM-165’s Org Code changed from GC5 to 
GCJ when they deployed to Kuwait in 2018. 







2018-08  USMC GC5 VMM-165 
2018-09  USMC GC5 VMM-165 
2018-10 USMC GCJ VMM-165 SPMAGTFCCK 
2018-11 USMC GCJ VMM-165 SPMAGTFCCK 
2018-12 USMC GCJ VMM-165 SPMAGTFCCK 
 
Instances occur where squadrons have duplicate monthly entries as they have 
aircraft under their administrative control in multiple locations. To remove the duplicate 
entries, the data from the DP-0036 should be recalculated to reflect that squadron’s 
aggregate readiness measurement. For example, before their return from the previously 
mentioned deployment in Kuwait, VMM-165 sent a small number of Marines back to their 
location at MCAS Miramar to accept aircraft from other squadrons. This means they had 
aircraft in both Kuwait and California, generating two monthly readiness entries. To get an 
accurate readiness estimation, VMM-165’s data is merged and recalculated generating one 
entry representing VMM-165’s aggregate MC% for March 2019. Table 12 shows their 
original entry with two Org codes for March 2019, one of which represents the squadron’s 
contingency in support of SPMGTF-CR-CC while the other represents the squadron’s 
contingency in Miramar, CA. Table 13 shows the aggregate readiness for the squadron 
after the data is merged. 
50 






Squadron EIS Hrs 
MC 
Hrs MC % 
AVG 
AC 
2019-03  USMC GC5 VMM-165 1,092 1,092 100.0% 1.5 
2019-03  USMC GCJ VMM-165 SPMAGTFCCK 8,928 6,664 74.6% 12.0 






Squadron EIS Hrs 
MC 
Hrs MC % 
AVG 
AC 
2019-03  USMC GC5 VMM-165 9539 7756 81.31% 12.8 
 
While the MCCRAT data set provides a binary variable representing whether the 
squadron was deployed, there are instances where squadrons were partially deployed 
whereby only a portion of their aircraft and personnel were deployed while the remainder 
of the squadron was operating from the unit’s home location. To best capture the unit’s 
readiness while the unit had personnel deployed overseas, the deployment variable in 
MCCRAT is changed to DEPLOYED if the squadron had more than 60% of its aircraft 
and personnel deployed overseas for more than 90 days, PART-DEPLOYED if the unit 
had 40%-60% of its aircraft and personnel deployed overseas for more than 90 days, and 
NON-DEPLOYED if the unit had less than 40% of its aircraft and personnel deployed for 
more than 90 days. Figure 22 shows the distribution of units that were deployed, partially 









 MV-22 Deployment Distribution 
Table 14 shows the unit participation in overseas deployments by operation during 
the sample period. The deployments supported by the three MAWs during the sample 
period consisted of the following:   
• Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
• Special MAGTF Crisis Response AFRICOM (SPMAGTF-CR-AF) 
• SPMAGTF-CR-CC 
• Maritime Rotational Force Darwin (MRF-D) 
• MEUs 
OEF began as a direct result of the actions that took place on September 11th, 2001. 
Combat operations are continuing at the time of this research; however, Marine MV-22 
squadrons are no longer deploying to Afghanistan. The first MV-22 squadron to deploy to 
Afghanistan in 2009 Operation Enduring Freedom would also be the last with VMM-261 
departing Helmand province in September 2014. SPMAGTF-CR-AF is a Special MAGTF 
based out of Morón Airbase in Spain which began in December 2013. MV-22 squadrons 










of 2017 when VMM-266 sent half their aircraft back to New River. VMM-764 replaced 
VMM-266 and SPMAGTF-CR-AF would be supported by roughly four to six MV-22s 
henceforth. SPMAGTF-CR-CC is a SPMAGTF operating out of Al-Jaber Airbase, Kuwait, 
which began in October 2014. Every squadron that supported SPMAGTF-CR-CC 
maintained a full complement of MV-22s during their deployment, except for those 
deployed to Kuwait from November 2016 to November 2017. During this timeframe, these 
squadrons only maintained around four to six aircraft. MRF-D is a rotational military force 
forward-deployed to Darwin Australia. MV-22 squadrons from MAG-24 have supported 
three iterations of MRF-D from 2017–2019. VMM-268 supported MRF-D in 2017 with 4 
aircraft; however, each subsequent MV-22 deployment was supported with a full 
complement of MV-22s.  
Marine Expeditionary Units are rotational MAGTFs that most commonly deploy 
aboard U.S. Naval vessels. There are seven standing rotational MEUs: the 11th, 13th, and 
15th MEUs are headquartered in Camp Pendleton, California, the 22d, 24th, and 26th 
MEUs are headquartered in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the 31st MEUs is forward-
deployed in Okinawa, Japan. MEU rotations are cyclical; therefore, one CONUS East 
Coast and one CONUS West Coast MEU are typically deployed at any given time. While 
the deployed unit is operating overseas, the others are either in a pre-or post-deployment 
operational period. CONUS-based MEU deployments are typically deployed overseas for 
six to seven months (HQMC n.d.). The 31st MEU, however, does not deploy for seven 
continual months. This MEU will typically embark on two patrols of the U.S. 7th fleet of 
operations, in a year. VMM-262 and VMM-265 are the only two operational MV-22 units 
permanently stationed in Japan, therefore, one squadron will support the MEU each year 
participating in both the fall and spring patrol. Shortly after the Spring patrol, the other 




Table 14. MV-22 Deployment Distribution by Operation 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
55 
V. DATA DESCRIPTIONS AND GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to describe each variable of interest and use graphical 
analysis to understand how the variables have changed throughout the sample period, while 
also providing evidence of correlation between each predictor and MC%. Furthermore, 
examining the relationship between each variable and squadron deployment periods helps 
to determine how these variables change as a squadron prepares for, executes, and 
completes its primary mission of supporting the MAGTF while deployed overseas. The 
data for each variable is broken down by MAW to determine if the findings for each 
variable are consistent across each Wing during the sample period. The selection of the 
variables of interest, shown in Table 15, is influenced by the design, maintenance 
infrastructure, and operational characteristics detailed in Andresen and Williams (2011) as 
well as the Defense Acquisitions University (DAU) Integrated Product Support (IPS) 
Guidebook which outlines critical design specifications and logistics support required for 
major defense acquisitions programs (DAU, 2019).  
Table 15. Variables of Interest 
Category Measurement Variable 
Design Interface 
Reliability Airframe Hours MTBF 
Supportability NMCSHrs 
Maintainability MTTR 
Manpower Manpower Allocation 
Maintenance 
Qualifications 
Number of Marines 
Maintenance Planning 
and Management 
Workload Management Awaiting Maintenance Hours 
Manpower Utilization Maintenance Man-Hours 
Operations 
Operational Tempo Flight Hours 





2. Dependent Variable 
As stated in Chapter II MC% represents the average number of aircraft that were 
flight-worthy during the month, calculated in hours. Figure 23 shows that the average 
monthly MC% for each Wing declines steadily over the sample period; the exception being 
3d MAW’s slight increase from FY 2018 to FY 2020. Table 16 shows that the mean 
average monthly MC% for the MV-22 fleet was 50.5%, roughly 26.5 percentage points 
below the CNO’s MC% goal. 2d MAW had the highest monthly MC% during the sample 
period at 53.5%, while 1st and 3d MAW’s monthly MC% was roughly 5 percentage points 
behind at 48.5% and 48.6%, respectively.  
 
 MV-22 Monthly MC% by MAW 
Table 16. Average Monthly MC% Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly MC Percent FY 2013 – FY 2020 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 48.6 53.5 48.6 50.5 
Std Deviation 14.9 17.5 16.8 16.9 
Min 15.8 10.1 0.0 0.0 




3. Explanatory Variables 
(1) Design Interface 
The design interface product support element refers to the design characteristics of 
the airframe and its relationship with the other IPS elements required to support the 
platform. The DAU IPS Guidebook (2019) calls the design interface the “...leading element 
that impacts the product support elements because a well-performed design interface 
minimizes the logistics footprint, maximizes reliability, ensures that maintainability is user 
friendly and effective, and addresses the long-term issues related to obsolescence 
management, technology refreshment, modifications and upgrades, and overall usage 
under all operating conditions” (DAU, 2019, p. 63). The three measurements of effective 
design interface used for this study are reliability, supportability, and maintainability. 
Reliability measures the airframe’s robustness over time, maintainability measures the 
degree to which maintenance personnel can return an NMC aircraft to MC, and 
supportability measures how responsive the program is in product resourcing throughout 
the aircraft’s life cycle. (DAU, 2019)  
(1) Airframe Hours 
The number of flight hours accumulated on an airframe is recorded and documented 
by the OOMA server. Much like an automobile odometer, the number of airframe hours 
never decreases and is tracked until the aircraft’s disposal. The airframe hour variable 
represents the total operating hours of every airframe in a squadron’s possession during a 
given month. This is important in determining the impact that an aging airframe has on the 
squadron’s readiness. As shown in Figure 24, the average monthly number of airframe 
hours per squadron has risen with utilization. Figure 24 also shows a non-linear relationship 
between MC% and airframe hours. The relationship between average monthly MC% 
shows a rapid decline as the total number of airframe hours reaches 20,000 suggesting that 
the average number of airframe hours may have a negative impact on MC% up to 20,000 
hours. This is followed by a rapid increase up to the fleet maximum of 58,324 hours, shown 
in Table 17, however only 2d and 3d MAWs witnessed this increase. 1st MAW squadrons 
never had observations with more than 19,230 hours. This relationship is unlikely to be a 
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result of airframe hours per squadron alone. It could also result from an increase in the 
number of airframes per squadron driving up the total airframe hours. The extreme values 
witnessed on the right side of the graph are likely a result of not only increased airframe 
hours but also months with a higher number of total aircraft assigned suggesting correlation 
between the two explanatory variables. Table 17 also shows that on average, 2d MAW has 
a higher number of aircraft hours per squadron than 1st and 3d MAWs.  
 
 Monthly Average Airframe Hours by MAW 
Table 17. Monthly Average Airframe Hours Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Squadron Airframe Hours 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 10783 16222 12777.1 13778.6 
Std Deviation 4360 5381.9 6246.7 5989.4 
Min 1021.6 5841.7 0 0 
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(2) Mean Time Before Failure 
Mean time before failure (MTBF) measures the aircraft’s reliability by expressing 
how much utility a squadron will receive before the aircraft succumbs to an unscheduled 
NMC event, in hours. MTBF is calculated by dividing the total number of monthly flight 
hours by the total number of NMCU MAFS. 
 Total Flight HoursMTBF = 
Number of NMCU MAFS
 (4) 
Figure 25 shows the monthly MTBF declined slightly over the sample period, 
suggesting decreased reliability. However, this effect could also come from a decrease in 
the civilian and military fleet knowledge base or maintainer experience, none of which are 
captured in this study. Figure 25 also suggests positive correlation between MC% and 
MTBF providing evidence that increasing the time between NMCU events would increase 
squadron monthly MC%. Table 18 shows the mean MTBF between MAWs during the 
sample timeframe is similar, about 1.2 flight hours between NMC events, indicating that 
there were no significant differences in MTBF between the MAWs. 
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Table 18. Monthly MTBF Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Squadron Mean Time Before Maintenance 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 1.148 1.09 1.35 1.21 
Std Deviation .679 .848 .970 .885 
Min .066 0 0 0 
Max 5.769 6.476 9.136 9.136 
 
(3) NMCS 
NMCS represents the average percentage of EISHrs hours during the month that 
assigned aircraft were not flight-worthy, because they were waiting for high-priority 
requisitions to be filled by the supply department. NMCS is an aircraft status, therefore 
hours for multiple simultaneous requisitions are not double-counted; for example, if one 
aircraft is in an NMCS status waiting on one part for an hour and another aircraft is NMCS 
waiting for two parts for one hour, both aircraft accumulated one NMCS hour each for the 
hour they were NMC. Figure 26 shows that the percentage of NMCS aircraft increased 
over the sample time indicating that the aircraft is either increasing in supportability 
required or the response time of the supply system decreased. The summary statistics 
displayed in Table 19 shows that 2d MAW had the lowest average NMCS percentage at 
12.7% while 1st MAW had the highest at 16%. Figure 26 also shows a strong negative 
relationship between NMCS and MC% indicating that as the number of hours that aircraft 
are down waiting for supply parts increases, the percentage of available aircraft decreases. 
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 Monthly NMCS 
Table 19. Monthly NMCS Percent Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly NMCS Percent 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 16.0 12.7 15.8 14.6 
Std Error 10.1 9.2 9.8 9.7 
Min 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 46.9 54.3 77.7 77.7 
 
(4) Mean Time to Repair 
The mean time to repair (MTTR) variable expresses aircraft maintainability by 
calculating how long it takes the maintenance department to complete an NMC task, in 
hours. For this study, MTTR is calculated by dividing the number of monthly maintenance 
man-hours by the number of monthly NMC MAFS, both scheduled and unscheduled. The 
inclusion of scheduled maintenance events is an important distinction as it aids in 
determining how quickly the maintenance department can return an NMC aircraft to MC 
and whether this metric is important in predicting monthly MC%. In lieu of better data, this 
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MC% as it is assumed that a more experienced maintenance department could complete 
NMC discrepancies more quickly and efficiently.   
 Maintenance Man-HoursMTTR = 
Number of NMC MAFS
 (5) 
Next, Figure 27 shows that the MTTR steadily increased in each Wing over the 
sample period with 1st MAW witnessing a larger increase towards the end of the sample 
period than 2d or 3d MAW. Table 20 highlights this, showing that 2d MAW had the lowest 
mean MTTR of 9.56 hours per NMC MAF. Figure 27 also the relationship between MC 
and MTTR is erratic in each MAW and inconsistent across MAWs. If the assumption holds 
that correlation exists between maintenance experience and MTTR, this inconsistent 
behavior could be indicative of the variance in experience levels within each squadron’s 
maintenance departments. Conversely, it also could be an indication that no relationship 
exists between MTTR and MC%.  
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Table 20. Monthly MTTR Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly MTTR 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 11.76 9.56 10.26 10.25 
Std Error 4.39 3.66 4.15 4.08 
Min 2.05 .009 1.425 .009 
Max 34.4 27.59 33.71 34.54 
 
b. Manpower 
The manpower IPS element used for this study analyzes the effect that the number 
of maintenance personnel in each work center has on operational availability, while also 
considering the level of qualifications that that personnel have attained. This is to decide 
whether the current manpower levels are adequate in achieving the operational availability 
required to support the MAGTF and how readiness will be affected if these levels are 
adjusted. The two measurements used for this study include the allocation of total 
maintenance personnel and the number of QA qualified personnel by work center.  
(1) Maintenance Qualifications 
The number of maintenance qualifications expresses the average number of 
personnel who possess an advanced maintenance qualification for a given month. It is split 
between the CDI and QA variables; the CDI variable represents the monthly number of 
CDIs and the QA variable represents the number of CDQARs and QARs. These variables 
are significant because they represent the number of Marines who can certify that work has 
been completed per the NAMP, local regulations, and any applicable maintenance 
manuals. Like MTTR, this is also a way to analyze the impact that squadron maintenance 
experience has on monthly MC% as most of these Marines have at least four years of 
maintenance experience on the MV-22 platform. Figure 28 shows that the average number 
of CDI qualifications per squadron per month has increased across each MAW. Table 21 
shows that 2d MAW had the highest average number of CDIs per squadron followed by 
3d and 1st MAWs, respectively. Figure 28 also shows suggests positive correlation 
between the number of CDIs and MC%, however, the data from 1st MAW contradicts 
these findings indicating a negative relationship.  
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 Monthly Average Number of CDIs 
Table 21. Monthly CDI Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Number of CDI Qualifications 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 14.6 17.2 15.7 16 
Std Error 3.8 4.2 5 4.6 
Min 0 4 6 6 
Max 25 29 31 31 
 
Like the number of CDIs, Figure 29 shows that the number of QAs also increased 
over the sample period with Table 22 expressing that 2d MAW also had the highest mean 
number of QAs followed by 1st and 3d MAWs. Similarly, the QA data from 2d and 3d 
MAW also shows positive correlation between the number of QAs and MC%, with 1st 
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 Average Monthly Number of QAs 
Table 22. Monthly QA Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Number of QA Qualifications 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 13.6 15.1 12.6 14 
Std Error 4.07 3.97 3.77 4.16 
Min 4 6 2 0 
Max 29 34 28 34 
 
(2) Number of Maintenance Marines 
The number of maintenance Marines variable represents the average monthly 
number of maintenance Marines assigned to production work centers. This variable is 
important in determining how the number of personnel in the workforce who are 
maintaining the aircraft affects squadron readiness. This variable only reflects the number 
of Flightline, Avionics, Airframes, and Crew Chiefs assigned to one of the production work 
centers during the month; Marines in those MOSs who were assigned to a non-production 
work center such as Maintenance Control or Tool Room were not counted as they are 
unlikely to perform aircraft maintenance. Figure 30 shows that the number of production 
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MAW seeing a slight increase in manpower. Table 23 shows that 3d MAW had the highest 
number of maintenance Marines working in production work centers at 90.1, over 10 more 
Marines on average than 2d MAW. Figure 30 also suggests negative correlation between 
MC% and the number of Marines. However, it is unlikely that increasing the number of 
maintenance Marines causes MC% to decrease; it is more likely that the relationship 
between the number of one or more of the maintenance work centers and MC% is 
manipulating the relationship displayed in Figure 30.  
 
 Monthly Number of Maintenance Marines 
Table 23. Number of Maintenance Marine Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Number of Maintenance Marines Per Squadron 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 86.9 79.8 90.1 85.5 
Std Error 11.8 11.7 15.1 14.1 
Min 42 47 43 42 
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c. Maintenance Planning and Management 
The maintenance management and planning IPS element analyze the degree to 
which the execution of the Navy and Marine Corps’ maintenance system is influencing 
operational availability. It also provides insight into whether maintenance leadership is 
effectively managing the aircraft’s maintenance requirements as well as the variance in 
maintenance performance between squadrons. The primary measurement for maintenance 
management and planning used in this study is workload management expressed by AWM 
hours and manpower utilization expressed by direct maintenance man-hours per worker 
per day (DMMH/W/D).  
(1) AWM Hours 
NMC hours begin accumulating from the time the initial NMC MAF is logged 
against an aircraft until the time the last NMC MAF has been completed. In between this 
time, the NMC MAF is either in an in work (IW) status, awaiting parts (AWP) status, 
indicating that NMCS time is accumulating, or awaiting maintenance (AWM), indicating 
the MAF is waiting for maintenance personnel to be assigned to perform maintenance. The 
MAF is in an IW status while at least one maintenance Marine has assigned themself to the 
MAF in OOMA. The MAF is AWM when no maintainer is assigned to the MAF at which 
time the MAF is assigned a “Job Status” code to justify the inaction. The NAMP outlines 
the different Job Status codes that reflect the status of a discrepancy: 
• IW. In Work 
• JC. Job Complete 
• M1. AWM in Depot 
• M2. AWM SE/Hangar 
• M3. AWM Backlog 
• M4. AWM Off Shift 
• M5. AWM Other 
• M6. AWM Awaiting AIMD 
• M7. AWM Flight Operational 
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• M8. AWM Awaiting Other Shops 
• M9. Funding 
AWM hours help determine how well the squadron manages its maintenance 
workload by measuring the total amount of time that Marines were not able to work on an 
aircraft that were in an NMCM status. The AWM hours calculated for this study represents 
the sum of all M2 though M9 codes on NMC discrepancies; M1 codes are not calculated 
because NMCD hours do not contribute to a squadron’s MC%.  
However, the variance in the number of aircraft accumulating AWM hours 
produced an extreme range of values, resulting in a poor graphical representation of AWM 
hours. Therefore, to graphically display the data, the natural logarithm of AWM hours was 
calculated and represented in Figure 31. This figure shows that the average number of 
AWM hours per squadron per month has slowly risen over the sample period with Table 
24 showing that 2d MAW had the greatest average monthly AWM hours at 70846.9 hours, 
about 10,000 hours above the fleet mean. Figure 31 also shows that MC% decreases 
sharply as AWM hours increase.  
 
  




















2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Date










4 6 8 10 12 14
Awaiting Maintenance Hours
MC% and Awaiting Maintenance Hours
1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW V-22 Fleet
69 
Table 24. Awaiting Maintenance Hours Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Number of Maintenance Marines 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 52496.8 70846.9 54611.9 60609.8 
Std Error 58971.8 139319.6 98026.6 11499.3 
Min 612 147.7 526 52.6 
Max 438955.3 2043468 1112250 2043468 
 
(2) DMMH/W/D 
The DMMH/W/D variable represents the average number of hours that each Marine 
in production work centers worked on discrepancies while aircraft were in an NMC status 
during that month. This helps determine how manpower utilization affects readiness. 
Figure 32 shows that the DMMH/W/D has steadily increased in each MAW during the 
sample period. Table 25 shows that 1st MAW had the highest DMMH/W/D followed by 
2d and 3d MAWs, respectively. Figure 32 also indicates negative correlation between 
DMMH/W/D and MC%. However, it is unlikely that MC% decreases as worker hours 
increase; this is more likely indicative of reverse causation in which worker hours are 
higher for squadrons who have a lower average MC%.  
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Table 25. DMMH/W/D Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Man Hours 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 1.05 1.09 .837 .976 
Std Error .580 .669 .452 .581 
Min .064 0 .016 0 
Max 2.77 4.16 2.76 4.16 
 
d. Operations 
The operations category helps determine how the squadron’s operational tempo 
influences operational availability and whether readiness differs while squadrons are 
deployed. The measurements for squadron operations include the number of flight hours, 
the average number of aircraft assigned (AVGAC), and the squadron’s deployment status, 
either fully deployed or partially deployed.  
(1) Flight Hours 
The flight hours variable represents the average monthly flight hours executed 
during the month. Examining flight hours is important because a rise in flight hours 
increases the scheduled maintenance required as many scheduled maintenance inspections 
are based on total hours flown. A rise in flight hours also increases aircraft system 
utilization which will slowly degrade and fail with usage, increasing both unscheduled 
maintenance and airframe hours. Figure 33 shows that each MAW flew about the same 
number of hours on average during the sample timeframe and that the number of flight 
hours has remained relatively constant. Table 26 shows that 3d MAW had the highest flight 
hour average at 175.8 hours, followed closely behind by 1st and 2d MAWs. Figure 33 
suggests positive correlation between flight hours and MC%, however during months 
where flight hours exceed 350 hours, squadrons flew more than double the fleet mean of 
173.4. MC percentages at this level of increased flight operations may not be a result of 
flight hours alone and may have been flown during a deployment where flight operations 




 Average Monthly Flight Hours 
Table 26. Average Monthly Flight Hour Summary Statistics 
Average Monthly Total Flight Hours 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 173.8 170.6 175.8 173.4 
Std Error 56.8 72.5 84.16 75.4 
Min 11.2 0 0 0 
Max 361 637.4 533.4 637.4 
 
(2) Average Number of Aircraft Assigned 
The AVGAC variable represents the average number of aircraft assigned to a 
squadron during a given month. It is calculated by dividing the number of EISHrs by the 
number of days in the month. The AVGAC variable is not only significant in determining 
the relationship between the number of aircraft assigned and MC%, but also in examining 
the effects that the explanatory variables have on MC% while controlling for the number 
of aircraft assigned. This is because aircraft are routinely transferred across squadrons and 
not every MV-22 squadron will have the same number of aircraft assigned every month. 
No doctrine exists to determine the number of aircraft assigned; assignment is typically 
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necessity. MV-22 squadrons are built to support 12 aircraft which is typically the 
assignment goal; Figure 34 shows the central tendency is significantly higher as AVGAC 
gets closer to 12. 
 EISHrsAVGAC = 
Number of Days in Month
 (6)  
 
 MV-22 Squadron Aircraft Distribution 
Figure 35 shows that 1st MAW’s AVGAC remained relatively stable during the 
sample period, while 3d MAW’s increased slightly. 2d MAW saw a slight increase in 
AVGAC followed by a gradual decrease. Figure 35 also shows a non-linear relationship 
between AVGAC and MC%. As the AVGAC increases toward the mean, MC% increases. 
However, each Wing differs at which point this increase peaks. The MC% for 2d and 3d 
MAWs does not peak until they reach around fifteen aircraft. Conversely, 3d MAW saw a 
decline in MC% as the AVGAC reach 13, indicated that at some point there are too many 
aircraft to maintain and MC% suffers as a result. 1st and 2d MAW’s data did not indicate 
this finding, likely because they recorded fewer observations with AVGAC this high and 
never reached the point where MC% suffered due to an overwhelming number of aircraft 
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highest mean average aircraft per squadron at 11.6, while 2d and 3d MAWs averaged about 
1 aircraft less at 10.59 and 10.29, respectively.  
 
 Monthly AVGAC 
Table 27. Monthly AVGAC Summary Statistics  
Average Monthly Number of Aircraft Assigned 
 1st MAW 2d MAW 3d MAW Fleet 
Mean 11.58 10.59 10.29 10.64 
Std Error 1.06 2.23 2.83 2.41 
Min 5.27 1.22 .125 .125 
Max 15.29 15.94 19.53 19.53 
 
(3) Deployments 
The deployed variable represents periods where squadrons were either entirely or 
partially deployed in support of OEF, MRF-D, the MEU, or one of the Crisis Response 
Special MAGTFs. The deployed variable is critical in understanding how both MC% and 
the explanatory variables differ when the squadron is deployed compared to operating from 
their home location. Figure 36 shows that the MV-22 squadrons which supported four of 
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exception of which is MRF-D where squadron averages were about twelve percentage 
points lower than the non-deployed average.  
 
 MV-22 MC% by Deployment 
This increase in MC% experienced during the deployment period is routinely 
followed by a significant decrease in MC% after the squadron’s return. Figure 37 shows 
the relationship between 2d MAW’s deployment participation and MC% during the sample 
period. Each full and partial unit deployment sustains an MC% above the mean during the 
deployment, which is always followed by a significant decrease below the mean. This 
significant decrease in MC% appears to surpass the post-deployment leave period and 
remains low. The MC% recovery period varies by squadron, but in some instances, 
readiness did not recover until the squadron departed for the next deployment. These 
findings were similar for 1st and 3d MAWs. (See Appendix A: Deployment Graphs:1st 
and 3d MAWs) 
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 Deployments and 2d MAW MC% 
Figures 38 and 39 show that the total number of maintenance Marines and the total 
number of QA qualified personnel also decreases after a deployment. This is typical as the 
MAG prioritizes deploying squadrons over others, meaning unit staffing levels are often at 
their highest during the deployment. Some Marines are also afforded the option to extend 
their enlistment contract to participate in the deployment, increasing the number of Marines 
whose contracts will end just after deployment. Marines who have just completed their 
initial contract have four to five years of maintenance experience and have usually attained 
at least a CDI qualification. Some of these Marines will be replaced by other QA-qualified 
Marines moving from other units, however, the majority will be replaced by junior Marines 
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 Deployment and 2d MAW Number of Marines 
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Similarly, many of the other explanatory variables have means during the 
deployment periods that differ significantly from those operating from their home location, 
shown in Table 28. The most significant of which are the squadron’s AWM hours, 
maintenance man-hours, and flight hours. When squadrons are not deployed, they typically 
fly and conduct maintenance five days a week, however during a deployment, squadrons 
typically fly and conduct maintenance seven days a week. Therefore, the mean AWM 
hours, maintenance man-hours, and flight hours for both fully and partially deployed 
squadrons are higher than non-deployed squadrons.  
Table 28. Explanatory Variable Means During Deployments 
Mean Values During Deployment 




AF Hrs 12334 18709 14062 
MTBF 1.29 1.02 1.06 
MTTR 11.5 9.86 9.87 
AWM 23692 67624 71936 
Maint Man-Hrs 2208.3 2081.4 1794.3 
CDIs 17 20.2 15.6 
QAs 14.8 20.7 13.5 
Flight Hrs 212 201.3 160.4 
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VI. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
 INTRODUCTION 
To answer the research questions, this study uses MLR to make statistical 
inferences to the degree to which the independent variables predict the change in a 
squadron’s MC%. The regression model is expanded to highlight the predictive power 
within the maintenance work centers then reduced because of multiple violations of the 
assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. A predictive model is then used 
to conduct a post-hoc analysis of the coefficients and how marginal changes in the aircraft 
design interface and the number of QA qualified personnel can help forecast the probability 
of achieving the CNO’s MC% goal.    
 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The purpose of multivariate linear regression is to estimate the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and dependent variable through the OLS estimation method 
which minimizes the variance between the observed and predicted values. These estimators 
allow for statistical inferences to be made when explicitly controlling for other explanatory 
factors. This is an extremely important and widely used tool for empirical analysis, 
however, to obtain unbiased estimators, several assumptions must be made as highlighted 
by Wooldridge (2016). These assumptions include: 
• Linear model 
• Random sampling 
• No perfect collinearity 
• Zero conditional mean 
• Homoskedasticity 
When these assumptions are met, the OLS estimators for the sample represent the 
best linear unbiased estimator of the population (Wooldridge 2016). Additionally, the 
coefficient of determination or r-squared value provides insight into the model’s strength 
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by assigning a value to the proportion of the variance that is being predicted by the 
independent variables. However numerous conditions may arise which can limit the 
predictive power of the model. One of which is the inclusion of irrelevant explanatory 
variables; this is known as overfitting the model. This forces the model to estimate not only 
the variance of the explanatory variables but also the unexplained variance or noise in the 
sample data. The second is omitted variable bias, a phenomenon that occurs when not 
enough relevant predictors have been presented to accurately estimate a relationship; this 
is commonly referred to as an underfit model. 
1. Full Model 
The MV-22 DECKPLATE readiness data and MCRAT qualification data were 
input into Stata 16 and merged using squadron as the panel variable and months as the time 
variable, resulting in 1458 total squadron months. The linear model begins with the nested 
set of predictors based on the categorical framework from Table 15, shown in Equation 7. 
The exhaustive list of regression models can be found in Appendix D: Comprehensive 
Regression Models. Additionally, because of the curvilinear relationships identified in the 
graphical analysis, a squared value for the AVGAC and Total Flight Hrs is introduced to 
accurately describe the nonlinear relationship between these variables and MC%. A fixed-
effects model is used as it is assumed that the parameters are non-random. Additionally, 
without data to properly analyze maintenance experience, it is assumed that correlation 
exists between the error term, the predictor variables, and the dependent variable. 
0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , ,st s t s t s t s t i s tY X X X X aβ β β β β ε= + + + + + +  (7) 
where: 
X1s,t = Design Interface Variables 
X2s,t = Manpower Variables 
X3s,t = Maintenance Planning and Management Variables 
X4s,t = Operations Variables 
ai = Unobserved fixed effects  
εs,t, = Residual 
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s = Squadron 
t = Time in Months 
 
The results of the full model are presented in the first column of Figure 40. The 
overall r-squared value for the full model is only .446; therefore, the predictor variables 
only explain 44.6% of the variance of monthly MC%. The within r-squared value is .415 
and the between r-squared value is .683, meaning that the model only explains 41.5% of 
the variation that occurs within the squadrons and 68.3% percent of the variation between 
the squadrons. According to the full model, NMCS has the greatest impact on MC% 
followed by DMMH/W/D and squadrons being either fully or partially deployed. However, 
the coefficient on DMMH/W/D is negative which is consistent with the findings from the 
graphical analysis. The suggestion that increased work hours will reduce MC% is contrary 
to common manpower principles and provides further evidence of reverse causation. 
Similarly, the coefficient on the number of Marines is also negative, and likely the result 
of variance from within the work centers.  
2. Model Expansion 
Both the graphical and regression analysis provided evidence of irregularities 
within the production work centers, therefore the number of Marines, QA, and CDI 
variables are divided into work centers to further analyze these irregularities and provide 
accurate measurements of the predictive power of each variable in each work center 
concerning MC%. The Crew Chief MOS is the reference variable for each work center 
predictor. The expanded model is expressed in Equation 9 (See Appendix D: 
Comprehensive Regression Models). 
The results of the expanded model are shown in the second column of Figure 40. 
The r-squared values of the expanded model are relatively unchanged, however, the 
number of predictors increased to 21 which can naturally inflate the r-squared value 
without increasing the predictive power of the model. The AFHrs and Total Flight Hrs 
variables still have an extremely small coefficient, and the AWM variable is still 
statistically insignificant. When divided by work centers, none of the CDI variables are 
statistically significant and the Airframes variable is the only statistically significant 
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variable of the work center personnel variables. However, this coefficient is negative, 
which is analogous to the logically invalid coefficient assigned to DMMH/W/D. This 
erroneous data is likely the cause of the erratic behavior shown in the graphical analysis 
and negative coefficient in the full model, despite the number of Marines variable being 
statistically significant. Conversely, all the work center QAs were found to be statistically 
significant.  
3. Model Reduction 
To prevent an overfit model, reduce multi-collinearity, and limit the impact of the 
extreme variance of multiple predictors, the model is reduced to only those that are 
significantly significant in increasing MC%, along with all QA qualification variables, 
shown in Equation 10, (Appendix D: Comprehensive Regression Models). The number of 
Marines and AWM variables are removed due to their statistical insignificance. The 
DMMH/W/D variable is also removed due to the reverse causation which resulted in the 
MTTR variable being insignificant.  
The final reduced model is shown in the third column of Figure 40. The r-squared 
value is 0.419, slightly lower than that of the expanded model. The coefficients changed 
little from the expanded model as these removed variables are seemingly irrelevant. 
However, the changes in statistical significance in the deployed and partially deployed 
variables show how much unexplained variance exists within the sample, a large portion 
of which lies within the squadron as evidenced by the .39 within r-squared value.  
The significance of each coefficient in an MLR model is interpreted as the effect 
that a one-unit change in the value of the explanatory variable has on the dependent variable 
when holding the other variables constant. According to the regression results, a unit that 
is deployed or partially deployed has 6.3% and 7.7% higher readiness on average, 
respectively than those that are not deployed. Additionally, an increase of one CDI or 
CDQAR per squadron increases MC% anywhere from 2% to 5%. A one-hour rise in MTBF 
increases readiness by about 5.5% whereas providing a squadron with one additional 
aircraft increases readiness by about 3%. However, due to the inverted curve expressed by 
the data, the impact of the AVGAC coefficient will only increase up to a specific aircraft 
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allotment that can be effectively maintained by maintenance personnel at which point its 
effects will diminish. Furthermore, a 1% increase in NMCS% will reduce readiness by 0.71 
percentage points. 
A larger coefficient does not necessarily generate a more significant change in the 
independent variable; likewise, a small coefficient should not be interpreted as a much 
smaller change. The significance of the coefficient is also determined by the size of the 
unit of measurement that is applied to the coefficient. For example, the coefficient for 
AFHrs is -3.32e-6, insinuating that AFHrs have an extremely small impact on MC. 
However, an increase of one airframe hour is also relatively small and deceptively 
insignificant, given the maximum service life of an MV-22 airframe is 10,000 hours. The 
mean of AFHrs during the sample period is 13,778.61 hours, which means given a 
squadron of around 12 aircraft, each airframe had slightly over 1,000 airframe hours. 
Future squadron personnel will see mean AFHrs increase exponentially throughout the life 
of the program therefore, given that the airframe will be utilized for multiple decades, this 
seemingly insignificant number will become much more meaningful as the program 
progresses. 
Furthermore, the resources required to generate a unit one change in explanatory 
variables can differ greatly. The cost of generating one additional flight hour is much 
different than design changes required to increase the MTBF by one hour or the personnel 
and training costs required to increase the average number of CDIs or CDQARs in each 
work center throughout the fleet. This level of analysis would require a much deeper 
examination of total life cycle cost and resource allocation.  
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 Regression Models 
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 STOCHASTIC MODELING 
The purpose of the stochastic modeling is to perform a sensitivity analysis on 
multiple variables of interest, using the coefficients from the reduced regression model to 
see how marginal changes will impact the likelihood of achieving a true mean MC of .77. 
This happens by estimating the probability of the sample distribution when simulating the 
variability of the coefficients 50,000 times. The distribution of each variable, the constant, 
and the error term from the final model are input into Microsoft Excel and the Monte Carlo 
simulation was run using the Oracle Crystal Ball add-in for Excel. The control variables 
include full and partial deployments, AVGAC, AFHrs, and Total Flight Hrs as it is assumed 
that these variables will remain within the standard deviation of their means and changes 
are unlikely. The MTBF, NMCS, CDI, and QA variables shown in Table 29 are selected 
as decision variables as they are the most likely predictor variables that can reasonably be 
adjusted to increase MC%. 
Table 29. Simulation Decision Variables 














1. Simulation of Marginal Improvements 
The MV-22 sample mean MC is only above .77 in 99 out of 1458 observed months, 
with a success rate of about 6.79%. The first simulation with the decision variables at their 
sample means, results in a 6.74% probability of a true mean of .77, nearly identical to the 
historical success rate. Marginal improvements of 10%, 15%, and 20% of the sample 
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means shown in Table 29 were simulated, which means NMCS is reduced while each work 
center qualification and MTBF is increased by the respective percentage shown in Table 
30. The results shown in Table 30 show that improvements of 10%, 15%, and 20% in the 
sample means of each of these decision variables result in an 8.21%, 9.38%, and 11.83% 
probability of a true mean of .77, respectively.  
Table 30. Decision Variable Means 
 








MTBF 1.216 1.337 1.398 1.45 
NMCS .146 .131 .124 .117 
AVICDI 5.09 5.59 5.85 6.11 
AFCDI 6.36 6.99 7.31 7.63 
FLCDI 4.65 5.11 5.34 5.58 
AVIQA 4.41 4.85 5.07 5.29 
AFQA 5.136 5.64 5.90 6.61 
FLQA 4.50 4.95 5.17 5.40 
MTBF 1.216 1.337 1.398 1.45 
Probability of 
Mean > .77 6.74% 8.21% 9.38% 11.83% 
 
2. Simulation of Decision Variables Based on Successful Means 
At current resource levels, the probability of achieving a true mean of .77 is 
infeasible through continual increases of the decision variables alone. However, as shown 
in Table 31, the sample means of each work center qualification variable and MTBF is 
higher in months where readiness is higher than .77. Additionally, the sample mean of 
NMCS is lower in months where readiness is higher than .77. Furthermore, NMCS and 
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MTBF both showed average improvements of 68.6% and 170.3%, respectively, during 
these months. 
Table 31. Decision Variables When MC% is Greater Than .77 
Variable Mean Mean when MC > .77 Difference % Change 
MTBF 1.216 2.05 .83 68.6% 
NMCS .146 .054 .92 -170.3% 
AVICDI 5.09 5.13 .04 .78% 
AFCDI 6.36 6.38 .02 .31% 
FLCDI 4.65 4.75 .10 2.1% 
AVIQA 4.41 5.16 .75 17.1% 
AFQA 5.13 5.77 .64 12.47 
FLQA 4.50 4.81 .31 6.88% 
 
The next two simulations are run with manpower and design interface variables 
isolated to determine the distinct effects of each. Manpower is held constant at the sample 
mean, while NMCS and MTBF values were simulated at the sample mean when MC% is 
greater than .77. During the second simulation, manpower is increased by an average of 
one Marine in every variable while MTBF and NMCS are simulated at their sample means. 
The third and final simulation forecasts the effects of both NMCS and MTBF at their means 
when MC% is greater than .77 and each QA qualification is increased by an average of 1 
Marine. The results in Table 32 show that improving the MTBF and NMCS to their means 
when MC has historically been greater than .77 has a greater impact on the probability of 
achieving a true mean of .77 than increasing each maintenance qualification by an average 
of one Marine. However, improving NMCS, MTBF, and increasing the number of 
maintenance qualifications by one Marine will increase the probability of achieving a true 
mean of .77 to about 22%, much higher than the historical mean of 6.79%. 
  
88 
Table 32. Decision Variables Simulated When Means Were Greater Than .77 
Variable 
Values 
CDI/QA Sample Mean CDI/QA Increase of 1 CDI/QA Increase of 1 
NMCS & MTBF Mean 
When MC >.77 
NMCS & MTBF 
Sample Mean 
NMCS & MTBF Mean 
When MC >.77 
MTBF 1.337 1.398 1.45 
NMCS .131 .124 .117 
AVICDI 5.59 5.85 6.11 
AFCDI 6.99 7.31 7.63 
FLCDI 5.11 5.34 5.58 
AVIQA 4.85 5.07 5.29 
AFQA 5.64 5.90 6.61 
FLQA 4.95 5.17 5.40 




17.46% 8.33% 22.00% 
 
3. Summary 
Given these results, the MLR model explains much less of the variability that exists 
within MV-22 squadrons than the author had hoped. The predictive power of the model is 
not robust enough to support an accurate estimation of each of the IPS categorical variables 
of interest displayed in Table 15. Numerous variables of interest are found to be statistically 
insignificant while others violated the assumptions of OLS. Both occurrences severely 
limit the predictive power of the regression model and are removed from consideration. 
The model does suggest that improvements in the number of QA qualified personnel, 
NMCS, and MTBF would have a positive effect on MC%. This inference is further 
substantiated by the results of the Monte Carlo simulation. It shows that increases in 
NMCS, MTBF, and the number of QA qualified personnel will increase the likelihood of 
predicting a mean of .77. Furthermore, the results of the simulation suggest that NMCS 
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and MTBF together have a greater impact on MC% than increasing the number of QA 
qualifications by an average of one. However, due to the low predicting power of the 
regression model, the findings poorly explain the variance in both the sampling distribution 
and the MV-22 IPS elements. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation suggest that the 
likelihood of reaching the CNOs goal is seemingly small, and that increasing this 


























VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 SUMMARY 
Despite its turbulent test and evaluation period, the MV-22 Osprey has proven itself 
as a highly effective addition to Marine Corps aviation. MV-22 squadrons have been 
deployed overseas in support of countless operations, providing the MAGTF with a 
versatile assault support platform. However, the MV-22 program cannot sustain the CNO’s 
MC goal of 77% MC, and the program’s average during the sample period is around 26.5 
percentage points below this threshold. This study examines eight years of MV-22 
operational squadron historical data consisting of multiple IPS elements to understand 
which product support elements are significant in increasing the likelihood of meeting the 
CNO’s 77% MC goal.   
This study highlights several correlations between the IPS elements and MC%, 
such as NMCS, MTBF, the number of CDQARs and QARs, and the squadron’s 
deployment status. Additionally, this study determines that the means for many explanatory 
variables, such as AWM, Total Flt Hrs, and DMMH/W/D, differ significantly when a 
squadron is fully or partially deployed. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulation was able to 
determine that increases in manpower allocation and design interface characteristics would 
increase the likelihood of meeting the CNO’s MC goal. However, due to the low predictive 
power of the MLR model and given the significant amount of unexplained variance, this 
study is unable to accurately predict optimum resource levels to increase the likelihood of 
achieving 77% MC.  
 CONCLUSIONS  
The following conclusions are summarized to answer the research questions 
proposed in Chapter I. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
• What explanatory factors are statistically significant in predicting an MV-
22 squadron’s readiness, as measured by the total monthly MC%?  
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The results of the reduced MLR model show that the squadron’s deployment status, 
NMCS, AVGAC, MTBF, AFHrs, number of CDQARs and QARs, and Total Flt Hrs are 
statistically significant in predicting MV-22 squadron readiness. This does not mean the 
other explanatory variables included in the model, such as the total number of personnel 
and the total number of CDIs, are not critical to squadron success. This means rather that 
there is a low degree of confidence in the predicting power of each coefficient given the 
sample data. Increasing the predictive power of the model by introducing additional 
relevant variables would likely increase the confidence of these predictors.  
• How do these factors change throughout the squadron’s deployment 
cycle? 
A certain degree of correlation exists between each predictor and the squadron’s 
deployment status. Squadrons actively deployed and squadrons preparing for deployment 
are the MAWs highest priority for support. As a result, the mean number of Marines, QA 
qualifications, and NMCS are higher while squadrons are deployed. Furthermore, a 
squadron works seven days a week when deployed, as opposed to five days a week when 
non-deployed. Therefore, mean DMMH/W/D is higher during deployments while mean 
AWM is lower. Additionally, squadrons see a reduction of manpower and MC during the 
post-deployment period. This period typically begins the month the squadron returns from 
deployment, however, the MC% reduction after a squadron returns from a deployment can 
last anywhere from a month to the squadron’s departure for the next deployment.   
2. Secondary research Questions 
• How much variability is left unexplained after modeling the statistically 
significant explanatory factors? 
The overall coefficient of determination for the final MLR model is .419, which 
means this model only explains 41.9% of the variation in squadron MC%. The within r-
squared value of .39 is much lower than the between r-squared value of .648, meaning that 
more of the variance between squadrons is being captured than within the squadrons. The 
author hypothesizes that maintenance experience, as well as behavioral factors such as 
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leadership, command climate, and work center morale, are a few of the factors that 
influence MC% from within the squadrons, which are not efficiently captured by the 
model. It is also likely that these omitted factors within the error term are correlated with 
the explanatory variables such as DMMH/W/D and MTBF.  
• What explanatory factors can be altered to increase the probability that 
MV-22 squadrons will achieve 77% average monthly MC%. 
The results of the Monte Carlo simulation show that increasing both manpower and 
design interface IPS elements will increase the likelihood of achieving a mean MC% of 
77%. Improving the MTBF and NMCS variables will have a greater effect on MC% than 
the number of CDIs and CDQARs, however by improving MTBF and NMCS to the mean 
values when MC was above .77, and increasing the number of qualifications by one in each 
work center, will increase the likelihood of achieving a mean MC% of 77% by 22%.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Changes 
Not unlike budget restrictions on large firms and corporations, Marine Aviation 
also faces resource limitations. In support of the MAGTF, the MV-22 program is 
specifically funded to support a certain level of operational availability necessary in 
executing its mission. If the program occasionally drops below this MC% threshold, this 
may not lead to an existential national security threat. However, the MV-22 platform has 
only met this threshold annually around 6.79% of the time from FY 2013 – FY 2020, a 
significant readiness shortfall that does not show signs of improvement. The results of the 
Monte Carlo simulation make it extremely clear that greater investment needs to be made 
in aircraft design, parts availability, and manpower staffing levels.  
Furthermore, squadrons experience a significant resource reduction as soon as they 
return from an overseas deployment. This naturally occurring shift in supportability is 
required as resources are allocated to the deployed squadrons, however, the subsequent 
decline in MC% will often plague a squadron for months, if not years. Though they are not 
the operation priority, these non-deployed squadrons still have a responsibility to train a 
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new cadre of maintenance Marines and aircrew. Increasing these resources to smooth out 
this post-deployment transition will not only increase overall MC% but will also result in 
more effective maintenance Marines and aircrew.  
2. Area for Future Research 
Data limitations, omitted variable bias, and violations of the OLS assumptions 
plague the MLR models and prevent a proper analysis of the optimal resourcing levels 
required for an increase in operational availability. The predictive power of the MLR 
models could be significantly improved with the addition of monthly maintenance 
experience, which would have likely reduced much of the unexplained variance. 
Additionally, a cross-sectional data set of quantitative maintenance experience would make 
the model more robust, as squadron maintenance skill levels likely have a significant 
impact on MC%. Lastly, providing maintenance leaders and researchers with the ability to 
pull historical squadron maintenance records from ASM would allow for a much better 
analysis of how maintenance skill levels increase over time and the relationship that 
maintenance experience has on each of the IPS elements.  
A further examination of the significant decrease in MC% when a squadron returns 
from a deployment could likely explain why operational availability for non-deployed units 
is so low. Examining how resource levels are different for deployed units versus non-
deployed units could assist in smoothing out this significant readiness decline. 
Additionally, exploring the effects of system design and supportability by aircraft 
subsystem could highlight areas where significant shortfalls exist in design characteristics 
and inventory levels. Furthermore, a cross-sectional data set of mean failure rates and 
supply turn-around time by WUC time could provide insight into how to prioritize 






APPENDIX A. DEPLOYMENT GRAPHS: 1ST AND 3D MAWS 
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1st MAW Deployments and Number of Marines
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3d MAW Deployments and Number of CDIs/QAs
100 
 




















2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
VMM-164 VMM-262 VMM-265
VMM-268 VMM-363 VMM-364










1st MAW Deployments and Number of CDIs/QAs
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APPENDIX B. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 





 Probability of True Mean Greater than .77 with 10% 




 Probability of True Mean Greater than .77 with 15% 
Decision Variable Improvement 
 
 
 Probability of True Mean Greater than .77 with 20% 
Decision Variable Improvement 
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 Probability of True Mean Greater than .77 with No 
Manpower Increase and NMCS MTBF at Means When MC Is 





 Probability of True Mean Greater than .77 with Manpower 
Increase and NMCS MTBF at True Means 
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 Probability of True Mean Greater than .77 with Manpower 





APPENDIX C. COMPREHENSIVE REGRESSION MODELS 
0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , 5 5, , 6 6, , 7 7, ,
8 8, , 9 9, , 10 10, , 11 11, , 12 12, ,
13 13, , 14 14, , 15 15, , ,
st s t s t s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t s t i s t
Y X X X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X a
β β β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + +
 (8) 
where: 
X1s,t = Deployed 
X2s,t = Partially Deployed 
X3s,t = NMCS 
X4s,t = AVGAC 
X5s,t = AVGAC Squared 
X6s,t = Airframe Hrs 
X7s,t = AWM Hrs 
X8s,t = Number of CDIs 
X9s,t = Number of QAs 
X10s,t = MTBF 
X11s,t = MTTR 
X12s,t = Number of Marines 
X13s,t = Total Flight Hrs 
X14s,t = Flight Hrs Squared 
X15s,t = DMMH/W/D 
ai = Unobserved fixed effects  
εs,t, = Residual 
s = Squadron 







0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , 5 5, , 6 6, , 7 7, ,
8 8, , 9 9, , 10 10, , 11 11, , 12 12, ,
13 13, , 14 14, , 15 15, , 16 16, , 17 17, , 18 18, ,
19 19 , 20
st s t s t s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t s t s t s t s t
s t
Y X X X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X X
X
β β β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + 20, , 21 21, , ,s t s t i s tX X aβ ε+ + +
 (9) 
where: 
X1s,t = Deployed 
X2s,t = Partially Deployed 
X3s,t = NMCS 
X4s,t = AVGAC 
X5s,t = AVGAC Hrs Squared 
X6s,t = Airframe Hrs 
X7s,t = AWM 
X8s,t = Number of AVI CDIs 
X9s,t = Number of AF CDIs 
X10s,t = Number of FL CDIs 
X11s,t = Number of AVI QAs 
X12s,t = Number of AF QAs 
X13s,t = Number of FL QAs 
X14s,t = MTBF 
X15s,t = MTTR 
X16s,t = Number of AVI Marines 
X17s,t = Number of AF Marines 
X18s,t = Number of FL Marines 
X19s,t = Total Flight Hrs 
X20s,t = Flight Hrs Squared 
X21s,t = DMMH/W/D 
ai = Unobserved fixed effects  
εs,t, = Residual 
s = Squadron 
t = Time in Months 
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0 1 1, , 2 2, , 3 3, , 4 4, , 5 5, , 6 6, , 7 7, ,
8 8, , 9 9, , 10 10, , 11 11, , 12 12, ,
13 13, , 14 14, , 15 15, , ,
st s t s t s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t s t s t s t
s t s t s t i s t
Y X X X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X a
β β β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + +
 (10) 
where: 
X1s,t = Deployed 
X2s,t = Partially Deployed 
X3s,t = NMCS 
X4s,t = AVGAC 
X5s,t = AVGAC Hrs Squared 
X6s,t = Airframe  
X7s,t = Number of AVI CDIs 
X8s,t = Number of AF CDIs 
X9s,t = Number of FL CDIs 
X10s,t = Number of AVI QAs 
X11s,t = Number of AF QAs 
X12s,t = Number of FL QAs 
X13s,t = MTBF 
X14s,t = Total Flight Hrs 
X15s,t = Flight Hrs Squared 
ai = Unobserved fixed effects  
εs,t, = Residual 
s = Squadron 
t = Time in Months 
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APPENDIX D. MV-22 DEPLOYMENTS FY 2013-FY 2020 
Table 33. 1st MAW Deployments FY 2013-FY 2020  




Oct   
Nov   
Dec   
2013 





Apr   
May   
Jun VMM-265  
Jul VMM-265  
Aug VMM-265  
Sep   
Oct   
Nov   
Dec   
2014 
Jan   
Feb VMM-265  
Mar VMM-265  
Apr VMM-265  
May   
Jun   
Jul   
Aug   
Sep VMM-262  
Oct VMM-262  
Nov   
Dec   
2015 
Jan   
Feb VMM-262  
Mar VMM-262  
Apr VMM-262  
May   
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Jun VMM-265  
Jul VMM-265  
Aug VMM-265  
Sep   
Oct   
Nov   
Dec   
2016 
Jan   
Feb VMM-265  
Mar VMM-265  
Apr   
May   
Jun   
Jul   
Aug   
Sep VMM-262  
Oct VMM-262  
Nov   
Dec   
2017 
Jan   
Feb   
Mar VMM-262  
















Oct   
Nov   
Dec   
2018 
Jan   
Feb   
Mar VMM-265  
111 




Apr VMM-265  
May   
Jun  VMM-268 
Jul  VMM-268 
Aug  VMM-268 
Sep VMM-262 VMM-268 
Oct VMM-262  
Nov   
Dec   
2019 
Jan VMM-262  
Feb VMM-262  
Mar   
Apr  VMM-363 
May  VMM-363 
Jun VMM-265 VMM-363 
Jul VMM-265 VMM-363 
Aug VMM-265 VMM-363 
Sep  VMM-363 
Oct   
Nov   
Dec   
2020 
Jan   
Feb VMM-265  
Mar VMM-265  
Apr VMM-265  
May   
Jun   
Jul   
Aug VMM-262  
Sep VMM-262  
1Indicates a squadron had between 40% and 60% of its assigned aircraft deployed away from its 






Table 34. 2D AND 3D MAW Deployments FY 2012-FY 2020 






Oct VMM-161 VMM-261    




Dec VMM-161 VMM-261   
2013 
Jan VMM-161/VMM-264  
  
Feb VMM-264    
Mar VMM-264 VMM-266   
Apr VMM-264 VMM-266   
May VMM-264 VMM-266   
Jun VMM-264 VMM-266   
Jul VMM-264 VMM-266    
Aug VMM-165/VMM-165 VMM-266  
VMM-162  
Sep VMM-165 VMM-266  VMM-162  
Oct VMM-165 VMM-266  VMM-162  
Nov VMM-165 VMM-266 VMM-166 VMM-162  
Dec VMM-165  VMM-166 VMM-162  
2014 
Jan VMM-165  VMM-166 VMM-162  
Feb VMM-165/VMM-261 VMM-263 VMM-166 
VMM-162  
Mar VMM-261 VMM-263 VMM-166 VMM-162  
Apr VMM-261 VMM-263 VMM-166 VMM-162  
May VMM-261 VMM-263  VMM-162  
Jun VMM-261 VMM-263  VMM-162  
Jul VMM-261 VMM-263  VMM-162  
Aug VMM-261 VMM-263 VMM-163 VMM-162/VMM-264 
 
Sep VMM-261 VMM-263 VMM-163 VMM-264  
Oct  VMM-263 VMM-163 VMM-264 VMM-363 
Nov   VMM-163 VMM-264 VMM-363 
Dec  VMM-365 VMM-163 VMM-264 VMM-363 
2015 
Jan  VMM-365 VMM-163 VMM-264 VMM-363 
Feb  VMM-365 VMM-163 VMM-266 VMM-363 
Mar  VMM-365  
VMM-266 VMM-363/VMM-
165 
Apr  VMM-365  VMM-266 VMM-165 
May  VMM-365 VMM-161 VMM-266 VMM-165 
Jun   VMM-161 VMM-266 VMM-165 
Jul   VMM-161 VMM-266 VMM-165 
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Aug   VMM-161 VMM-266/VMM-261 
VMM-165 
Sep   VMM-161 VMM-261 VMM-165 
Oct  VMM-162 VMM-161 VMM-261 VMM-268 
Nov  VMM-162 VMM-161 VMM-261 VMM-268 
Dec  VMM-162 VMM-161 VMM-261 VMM-268 
2016 
Jan  VMM-162  VMM-261 VMM-268 
Feb  VMM-162 VMM-166 VMM-261/VMM-263 
VMM-268 
Mar  VMM-162 VMM-166 VMM-263 VMM-268 
Apr  VMM-162 VMM-166 
VMM-263 VMM-268/VMM-
363 
May   VMM-166 VMM-263 VMM-363 
Jun  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-263 VMM-363 
Jul  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-263 VMM-363 
Aug  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-266 VMM-363 
Sep  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-266 VMM-363 
Oct  VMM-264 VMM-163 
VMM-266 VMM-363/VMM-
165 
Nov  VMM-264 VMM-163 VMM-266 VMM-165 
Dec  VMM-264 VMM-163 VMM-266 VMM-165 
2017 
Jan   VMM-163 VMM-266 VMM-165 
Feb   VMM-163 VMM-266 VMM-165 




Apr  VMM-365 VMM-163 
VMM-165/VMM-
364 
May  VMM-365  VMM-364 
Jun  VMM-365  VMM-364 
Jul  VMM-365 VMM-161 VMM-364 
Aug  VMM-365 VMM-161 VMM-261
1 VMM-364 
Sep  VMM-365 VMM-161 VMM-261
1 VMM-364 
Oct  VMM-365 VMM-161 
VMM-2611 VMM-364/VMM-
363 
Nov  VMM-365 VMM-161 VMM-261
1 VMM-363 
Dec  VMM-365 VMM-161 VMM-261
1 VMM-363 
2018 
Jan   VMM-161 VMM-261
1 VMM-363 
Feb  VMM-162  VMM-261
1 VMM-363 
Mar  VMM-162  VMM-261
1 VMM-363 









May  VMM-162  VMM-263
1 VMM-164 
Jun  VMM-162  VMM-263
1 VMM-164 
Jul  VMM-162 VMM-166 VMM-263
1 VMM-164 
Aug   VMM-166 VMM-263
1 VMM-164 
Sep   VMM-166 VMM-263
1 VMM-164 
Oct   VMM-166 
VMM-2631 VMM-364/VMM-
165 
Nov   VMM-166 VMM-266
1 VMM-165 
Dec  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-266
1 VMM-165 
2019 
Jan  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-266
1 VMM-165 
Feb  VMM-264 VMM-166 VMM-266
1 VMM-165 
Mar  VMM-264  VMM-266
1 VMM-165 
Apr  VMM-264  
VMM-2661 VMM-165/VMM-
364 
May  VMM-264 VMM-163 VMM-266
1 VMM-364 
Jun   VMM-163 VMM-261
1 VMM-364 
Jul   VMM-163 VMM-261
1 VMM-364 
Aug   VMM-163 VMM-261
1 VMM-364 
Sep   VMM-163 VMM-261
1 VMM-364 
Oct  VMM-365 VMM-163 
VMM-2611 VMM-364/VMM-
161 




Dec  VMM-365  VMM-161 
2020 
Jan  VMM-365  VMM-161 
Feb  VMM-365  VMM-161 
Mar  VMM-265  VMM-161 
Apr  VMM-365  VMM-161 
May  VMM-365  VMM-161 
Jun  VMM-365  
VMM-2631 VMM-161/VMM-
166 
Jul    VMM-263
1 VMM-166 
Aug    VMM-263
1 VMM-166 
Sep    VMM-263
1 VMM-166 
1Indicates a squadron had between 40% and 60% of its assigned aircraft deployed away from its 
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